Task Switching and Distractibility by Brand, Sarah Louise
Task Switching and
Distractibility
Sarah Louise Brand
University College London1
I, Sarah Louise Brand, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated
in the thesis.2
ABSTRACT
In this thesis I examined the effects of task switching on people’s ability to ignore
irrelevant distractors. Load theory proposes that distractor interference critically
depends on the availability of executive control to minimise the effects of irrelevant
stimuli (e.g. Lavie, 2000). Much work on task switching suggests that task switching
demands executive control in order to prepare for and implement a switch between tasks
(e.g. Monsell, 2003; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). I therefore hypothesised that
the executive demand of a task switch will result in reduced ability to reject irrelevant
distractors in selective attention tasks. The research reported provided support for this
hypothesis by showing that task switching results in greater distractor interference as
measured with the “flanker task” (e.g. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and with the attentional
capture task (e.g. Theeuwes, 1990), even when there was no overlap between the stimuli
and responses for the two tasks, and when task-repeated and switch trials were
presented within the same block (in AAABBB designs). This research also showed that
dissociable executive demands were involved in switching tasks (AAABBB), compared
with mixing tasks (ABAB versus AAA), and these executive demands were found to
control rejection of distractors in the flanker task and attentional capture task,
respectively. In addition, task switching reduced internal distraction by task-unrelated
thoughts. The contrast between the effects of task switching on internal versus external
sources of distraction further supported the involvement of executive control in task
switching. Finally, individual differences in operational span capacity predicted the
magnitude of task switching costs and flanker interference effects, suggesting the
involvement of executive control in both abilities. Overall, this research highlights a
new consequence of task switching on selective attention and distractibility, supporting
predictions derived from prevalent views on the role of executive control in task
switching and selective attention.3
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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction8
1.1 PREFACE
In order to efficiently perform even simple everyday tasks, the ability to rapidly shift
attention from one task to another is essential. For example, talking on the phone, whilst
driving, may require shifts in attention from the road to the conversation, and vice versa.
Performance in both tasks might be detrimentally affected because the need to shift
attention between tasks limits the ability to selectively attend to only task-relevant
information. Driving may be subject to greater distraction from irrelevant visual
information, such as a brightly coloured coat on a pedestrian, when switching attention
between driving and talking on the phone, compared to when focused solely on driving.
In this thesis I investigate the implications of load theory for performance in
selective attention tasks when executive control is loaded with a task switch. I review
evidence for the role of executive resources in the control of selective attention
predicted by load theory. I then review the literature regarding a role for executive
control in switching between two tasks, followed by a discussion of previous research
investigating the effects of task switching on distractor interference. Lastly, I introduce
the current study, which extends previous evidence supporting a role for executive
control in selective attention. Most of this previous research focused on the effects of
working memory load on selective attention. The current study investigates the effect on
selective attention performance of specifically loading executive control via a task
switch.9
1.2 EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION
A large body of research has investigated the ability to selectively attend to relevant
information and selectively ignore irrelevant information (e.g. distractors; for reviews
see Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). This research was for a long
time split between authors contending that attentional selection occurred at an early
stage of perceptual processing (e.g. Broadbent, 1958), and those who argued for a later
stage of selection, occurring after (at least some) semantic processing had taken place
(e.g. Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Load theory (Lavie, 2000, Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, &
Viding, 2004) was originally proposed as an answer to the early versus late selection
debate, accounting for the mixed findings regarding early versus late selection. When
the perceptual load of a visual display is high then load theory predicts that target
processing will consume attentional resources, leaving none left over to process
irrelevant information: this is early selection. Conversely, when perceptual load is low,
load theory argues that attentional resources spill over to irrelevant items in the visual
environment, and these items will be perceived and filtered out by later processes such
as memory or response selection: this is late selection.
More recently, load theory has been extended to include the mechanism by
which late selection occurs (e.g. Lavie, 2000; Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert & Viding, 2004).
Lavie and colleagues have suggested that executive control is required in order to
actively maintain priorities between task relevant stimuli and task irrelevant distractors.
This is a late selection mechanism because although perception of task irrelevant
distractors cannot be reduced, their interference on behaviour can be minimised.
Evidence for this late selection mechanism comes from recent selective attention
literature, which suggests that distractor processing can be determined by load on10
executive processes, for example working memory maintenance (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et
al., 2004). Greater load on these processes should increase distraction in selective
attention tasks because executive control cannot ensure low-priority irrelevant
information does not control attention.
Lavie and colleagues (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al, 2004) manipulated working
memory load by comparing low load blocks, in which a digit order to be maintained in
working memory was the same on all trials (e.g. always “6789”), and high load blocks,
in which subjects were requested to maintain a different memory set on each trial (e.g.
“4672” “3925” etc). Distractor interference effects in the flanker task (shown in greater
RTs when the distractor was incongruent versus congruent), which was performed
during the maintenance interval of the working memory task, were greater when a high
working memory versus low working memory load was being maintained. These
studies strongly support the contention that executive load increases interference from
distractors in a selective attention task.
De Fockert, Rees, Frith, and Lavie (2001) provide more direct, causal evidence
for a role of executive processes in controlling selective attention. A selective attention
task was performed concurrently with the working memory load task described above
(maintaining a digit order in working memory). As above, greater interference from
distractors was found under conditions of high versus low working memory load.
Neuroimaging results indicated both greater activity in areas associated with executive
control (i.e. prefrontal areas) and greater activity in areas implicated in the processing of
faces (e.g. fusiform gyrus, right inferior occipital lobe, and left lingual gyrus) under
high executive load. The discovery of increased activity associated with the presence of
distractor faces under high executive load strongly supports the contention that
executive load modulates distractor suppression.11
Lavie and de Fockert (2005) studied the effects of the demand on executive
control of maintaining representations in working memory (working memory load) on
interference from an irrelevant, singleton distractor in a visual search task (attentional
capture). Greater processing of the irrelevant singleton distractor when attempting to
attend to a predefined target was found under conditions of high (e.g. maintain the order
5739) versus low (maintain the order 1234) working memory load, further supporting
the theory that executive functions play an important causal role in successful
performance in selective attention tasks.
The above studies strongly suggest that executive resources act to control
selective attention. A task thought to directly measure the demand on executive control
resources is task switching. I now review the evidence supporting a critical role for
executive control resources in switching between tasks.
1.3 EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND TASK SWITCHING
Task switching has come to have a central role in studies investigating the role of
executive resources in preparing for performance of a task (e.g. Logan & Gordan, 2001;
Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Executive control is involved in monitoring
ongoing cognitive processes, activating relevant representations and procedures, and
suppressing irrelevant, distracting representations and procedures (Oberauer et al.,
2003). These control processes should be involved in switching the cognitive system
between the performance of two tasks.
A task requires its own ‘recipe’ (or “task-set”, e.g. Allport et al., 1994; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995; Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001),
including the rules of the task and stimulus-response mappings (such as: look for targets12
in one position, ignore distractors in another position; if letter X appears press one key,
if Z press another). Executive control should be involved in coordinating switching
between two tasks, including the manipulation and maintenance of task-sets. Executive
control is needed to activate the current task-set, as well as to inhibit the previous task-
set to disengage from it and ensure it does not compete with the relevant task-set for
control of behaviour. The reconfiguration of a task-set when switching from one task to
another (namely: selecting, linking and configuring processes required to perform the
task; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) should also require executive control. In addition, this
‘task-set reconfiguration’ may also involve the retrieval by executive control processes
of task-related information from long-term memory (LTM) on switch, but not pure,
trials (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). I now review the literature investigating whether such
executive processes are involved in task switching.
1.3.1 Effects of the interval between tasks on the task switch cost
The time interval between the response to one task and the stimulus of the other
(response-stimulus interval; RSI) allows for both the decay of task-sets and processes
that carry over from the performance of the previous task (task-set inertia; Allport,
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), as well as for active preparation of the next task to be performed
in cases of foreknowledge about which task will be performed next. Such active
preparation should heavily depend on executive control (e.g. task-set reconfiguration),
as previously discussed. Providing a sufficiently long RSI should, in principle, allow for
both full decay of previous task-sets and processes as well as full preparation of the
following task. In line with this expectation, substantial reduction in, and sometimes
complete elimination of, task switching costs occurs when there is sufficient preparation
time, i.e. task switch costs reduce as RSI increases from 0 secs up to roughly 0.6 secs13
(Allport et al., 1994; De Jong, 2000; Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000; Meiran,
1996; Rogers and Monsell, 1995, Experiment 3). The effect of RSI duration on task
switching cost is often termed the preparation effect. Whilst many authors agree with
the idea that preparation effects reflect the involvement of executive control in task
switching, for example, in cognitive reconfiguration of task rules (Meiran, 1996; 2000;
Rogers & Monsell, 1995), or goal setting (Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001; Sohn &
Anderson, 2001), others argue that the preparation effect is to do with non-executive
processes. These non-executive processes, such as perceptual processing of the cue,
required only when the task (and therefore cue) switches (e.g. Logan & Bundeson,
2003), or the decay of interference from the activation of previous task-sets (Allport et
al., 1994), also have time to complete before the switch trial when there is a longer RSI.
So far, the studies reviewed cannot distinguish between the relative contributions to the
preparation effect of two types of processes: top-down executive processes and bottom-
up processes such as carryover of inhibition and/or activation associated with a recently
performed task and perceptual cue processing.
In some cleverly conceived explicit task-cuing studies, Meiran, Chorev, and
Sapir (2000) manipulated the response-cue interval (RCI) and the cue-stimulus interval
(CSI) in order to investigate the relative contributions of executive processes and task-
driven processes to the effect of RSI on task switch costs. Executive processes could not
prepare for the upcoming switch until cue presentation because task order was
randomised. The greater the RCI the more inhibition can decay and the smaller the
expected task-driven component of the switch cost, and the greater the CSI the more
preparation time for executive processes, and the smaller the expected top-down
executive component of the switch cost. Increasing the RCI reduced switch costs,
suggesting that inhibition previously associated with the current task-set did explain part14
of the switch cost. However, there was a far greater reduction in switch costs with a
greater CSI, suggesting the cue allowed executive processes to prepare for the task, and
that this explained a far greater component of the switch cost. While task-driven
processes, such as carry over of inhibition associated with the current task set in earlier
trials, contribute to the switch cost, the time taken by executive processes contributes a
far greater amount. Note that because task order was randomised, the cue was processed
on every trial, even when the task repeated, and as such did not contribute to the task
switch cost. Additionally, task switch costs have been revealed to occur without a cue
switch (e.g. Logan & Bundeson, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), suggesting that the task
switch cost is not dependent on a cue switch on task switch trials.
Further support for the direct involvement of executive control in task switching
comes from studies comparing the effect on task switching costs of manipulations
altering the executive demand of a task switch with those altering task difficulty without
demanding executive resources. For example, Rubinstein et al. (2001, see also Allport
et al, 1994) demonstrated that only manipulations of task difficulty which affected
executive control (e.g. rule complexity) increased or decreased the switch cost. Changes
in task difficulty which did not affect executive control (e.g. stimulus discriminability)
did not affect the switch cost. These findings suggest that it is not the general increase in
task difficulty when switching versus repeating tasks which is responsible for the task
switch cost, but rather that task switch costs are specifically due to the executive
demand involved in task switch versus task repeat trials.
In all the above studies an unexpected finding was a residual switch cost that
remained even when the RSI was increased to over 1 second (Allport et al., 1994;
Meiran et al., 2000; Rogers and Monsell, 1995). All of the executive preparation for a
switch should be able to complete before stimulus presentation, and a residual switch15
cost which remains regardless of preparation time suggests executive processes cannot
fully explain the switch cost (Allport et al., 1994). It has been argued that a component
of executive preparation for a switch may be unable to complete until exogenously
triggered by the stimulus for the current task (Rogers and Monsell, 1995). Indeed,
Waszak, Hommel, & Allport’s (2003) findings suggest a possible exogenous process
that could trigger further top-down control after stimulus presentation. They found that
when a stimulus associated with both task-sets is observed in one task, it can reinstate
activation to the other previously associated task-set, resulting in activation of both the
relevant and irrelevant task-set. Even when executive processes are fully prepared for a
task switch, extra executive control may be triggered by exogenous processes (e.g.
reinstatement of activation to previous task-sets) to resolve the extra task-set
competition. The residual switch cost could, at least partly, reflect extra executive
control triggered by exogenous processes.
In summary, there is strong support in the literature for the general involvement
of executive control in preparing for a switch between tasks. This preparation effect on
task switch costs may at least partly reflect the top-down activation and suppression of
the relevant and irrelevant task-sets, respectively, by executive resources. I now discuss
research supporting the contribution of the activation and inhibition of task-sets to the
task switch cost in turn.
1.3.2 Executive control and task-set activation
There is much evidence in the literature supporting the claim that executive control in
task switching is required in order to activate the correct task-set (e.g. Luria & Meiran,
2005; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans,
2001).16
Evidence for the activation of task-sets in working memory comes from
response-congruency effects suggesting the task-set of the previous task affects
performance of the current task (see Luria & Meiran, 2005). For example, when a
response is correct for both the current and previous task-set, responses are faster than
when the response is only related to the current task-set and opposite to the response for
the previous task-set (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995). These findings are taken as
evidence that both the current and previous task-set are concurrently maintained in
working memory during task switching, and executive control acts to readjust the
activation of the task-sets as the requirement regarding which task to perform changes.
Mayr and Kliegl (2000, 2003) argue that it is more parsimonious to assume that
task-sets are activated in LTM by executive processes (i.e. retrieved from LTM/updated
into working memory) on switch trials, but not pure trials, rather than concurrently
maintained in working memory. According to this view, the switch cost reflects the time
taken by executive processes to retrieve task-sets from LTM on switch versus pure
trials.
In support of their theory, conditions making greater demand on retrieval
processes (such as retrieval of episodic versus semantic information) resulted in
increased task switch costs, whilst other elements of task difficulty unrelated to retrieval
demands did not affect task switch costs (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; see also Allport et al.,
1994; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). Similarly, in Rubinstein, Meyer, and Evans’
(2001) study, task switch costs were greater for conditions requiring the activation of a
larger number of task rules, requiring more activation to activate the task-set, versus a
smaller number of task rules. Azuma and Monsell (cited in Monsell et al., 2000) also
found that extra time was needed to switch to the task requiring the activation of a larger
number of more complex condition-action task rules. Importantly, the effect of17
retrieval-demand on switch costs was eliminated by allowing time for preparation for
the upcoming task (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000), strongly supporting the view that the
endogenous preparation carried out during the preparation interval involves the retrieval
of task-sets from LTM by executive control processes.
Within this LTM retrieval hypothesis, the response-congruency effects described
above, which are taken by some to be irrefutable evidence that both task-sets are
simultaneously actively maintained in working memory, can be accounted for as arising
from exogenously cued retrieval of the irrelevant LTM response code upon stimulus
presentation when stimuli cue both tasks. If task-sets are retrieved when cued by the
stimulus and activation reinstated to them, then the activation applied to currently
relevant task-sets will affect performance on later trials. Indeed, larger switch costs have
been observed for primed stimuli (seen previously in a previous task) versus unprimed
stimuli (not seen previously in a previous task; Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie,
2000; Waszak et al., 2003). For example, Waszak et al. (2003, Experiment 1) observed
greater switch costs for word reading when the specific word/picture Stroop stimuli had
previously been seen in the picture naming task, than when they had not. This implies
that when a stimulus seen in a previous task is presented in a new task (i.e. primed
stimulus), it can trigger retrieval and reinstatement of the activation associated with the
previous task-set, creating greater task-set competition and greater switch costs. This
supports the view that the activation of task-sets in LTM accounts for at least part of the
switch cost.
An interesting question is to what extent activating the correct task-set in LTM
prepares the cognitive system for a task switch. If activation of task-rules is the only
task preparation necessary prior to a task switch then providing sufficient task
preparation time along with cues specifically supplying the task-rules, in order that they18
no longer need to be activated by executive processes, should eliminate the preparation
effect on task switch costs. Indeed, providing a long time for task preparation before a
task stimulus appears, along with cues giving S-R mapping information eliminated both
the effect of preparation interval and retrieval-demand on task switch costs (Mayr &
Kliegl, 2000, Experiment 3). In other words, the amount of time given for executive
processes to prepare for a task and the executive demands of retrieving task-sets from
LTM only affected task switching costs when there was a need to activate task-sets in
LTM. When this need was removed by providing task-set information in the cue, there
was no longer an executive demand associated with a task switch. This suggests that
endogenous preparation for a task switch acts only to activate the task-set in LTM and
that this accounts for the fundamental demand on executive processes of switching
between tasks. Although additional demands can also contribute to the switch cost, it
seems that activating a task-set in LTM reflects an underlying process which must
necessarily be carried out by executive processes prior to a switch to a new task.
1.3.3 Executive control and task-set inhibition
In addition to the fundamental requirement to activate the currently relevant task-set,
executive control may also be required to suppress previously activated, now irrelevant,
task-sets to ensure they cannot compete for behavioural control. Mayr and Keele (2000,
Experiment 5) found that responses to the last trial in the sequence ABA are slower than
in the sequence ABC, suggesting executive processes inhibit task A in order to switch
away from it. When task A is encountered again this inhibition is still associated with it
and overcoming this inhibition slows the response. In the sequence ABC there is no
such inhibition to overcome and so responses to the third trial in this sequence are faster
than in the sequence ABA.19
Strong support for top-down inhibition of task-sets in task switching also comes
from findings of asymmetries between the costs of switching to well learned (dominant)
and less well learned (non-dominant) tasks. Using Stroop stimuli researchers observed
switch costs for switches from non-dominant to dominant tasks but not the other way
around (Allport et al., 1994, experiment 5; Allport & Wylie, 2000; Wylie & Allport,
2000). Similarly, switching from a non-dominant to dominant language in bilingual
participants resulted in significant switch costs which were not revealed when switching
from their dominant to their less dominant language (Meuter and Allport, 1999). These
counterintuitive asymmetries, with task switch costs only revealed when switching to,
but not from, a better learned task, can be explained by greater inhibition of dominant
task-sets (due to their greater activation requiring greater inhibition in order for them to
be disengaged from). When switching to a dominant task-set, which was suppressed
while performing the non-dominant task, there is greater suppression to overcome and it
will take longer for the task-set to gain a high enough level of activation to gain
behavioural control. The inhibition of previous task-sets is strongly supported by these
asymmetries.
However, studies by Rogers & Monsell (1995), Azuma & Monsell (reported in
Monsell et al., 2000) and Rubinstein et al. (2001) address this issue. These studies found
that the asymmetry of switch costs could be reversed, so that switch costs were greater
for a switch from dominant to non-dominant tasks. This is the asymmetry predicted by a
reconfiguration account of switch costs, with reconfiguration taking longer when
switching to the less well-learned, non-dominant task. For example, Azuma and
Monsell used Stroop stimuli and found that switch costs were greater when switching
from the dominant to the non-dominant task. In this study the incongruent part of the
Stroop stimulus was presented at delays of 160 or 320 ms, so that it was not initially20
present to cue the other task-set. This manipulation eliminates the need to suppress the
other task-set and as such eliminates the asymmetry in cost that is attributed to greater
suppression of dominant versus non-dominant tasks. The reversal of asymmetry, that is
the additional cost found now in a switch to the non-dominant task (versus dominant
task), is easily explained in terms of greater activation of task-set rules that is needed in
cases when these are less well learned (i.e. in non-dominant task).
In summary, the costs of switching to dominant and non-dominant tasks are
contributed to by both activatory and inhibitory top-down executive control. Which
asymmetry is observed may depend upon which task (dominant or non-dominant)
requires greater activation.
1.3.4 Executive capacity and task switch costs
Another approach to investigating the role of executive control in task switching
involves investigating the effects of executive demand on task switching. A series of
dual-task studies found that task switching performance was disrupted by concurrent
performance of secondary “central executive” tasks (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam,
2001): holding a working memory load on-line was associated with prolonged RTs to
switch trials.
Another experiment also revealed increased switch costs associated with a
concurrent requirement for executive processes to maintain items in working memory
(Hester & Garavan, 2005). In a primary task participants were shown a series of letters
during the maintenance period of a working memory load task (maintain a set size of 2,
5, or 8 letters) and asked to respond via key presses to whether the letter in each trial
was part of the memory set or not. On 25% of trials the letter appeared in another
colour, indicating that a switch should be made from this primary task to a secondary21
task, requiring either colour or vowel/consonant discrimination. Hester and Garavan
(2005) revealed that the task switching cost to this secondary task was increased when
the set size of items to be maintained in working memory was greater, suggesting a
causal role of executive resources in the control of task switching.
Given that working memory load modulates task switching costs (Baddeley,
Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Hester & Garavan, 2005) and despite the effect of working
memory span on dual-task performance (e.g. Kane & Engle, 2000; see introduction to
Chapter 6), it is interesting that most previous research has found no correlation
between working memory (executive) capacity and task switch costs (Kane and Engle,
2000; Oberauer, SuB, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000; Oberauer, SuB, Wilhelm,
& Wittmann, 2003; Miyake et al., 2000). For a more detailed review of the literature
regarding the effects of working memory capacity on task switching see the
introduction to Chapter 6.
In the experiments reviewed in Chapter 6, which did not reveal an effect of
working memory span on the task switch cost, task switching involved a confound
between task cues and switch cues (Kane and Engle, 2000; Oberauer et al., 2003;
Miyake et al., 2000), such that a response could be retrieved simply based on a
combination of the cue and stimulus (i.e. a combination of a certain cue and stimulus
can be learned, and the correct response retrieved based on the combined cue, thus
minimising or eliminating executive demand, see Arrington & Logan, 2004; Logan &
Bundeson, 2003; Logan & Schneider, 2006). Kane and Engle separated task cues and
stimulus cues such that correct responses could not simply be retrieved from memory by
a combined cue-stimulus cue. In this way the requirement to activate the correct task-set
in order to perform the current task was reinstated and thus the executive requirements
of the task switch increased. Removing the specific task cues revealed a significant22
effect of working memory span on task switching costs in both RTs and errors, with low
spans showing greater task switching costs than high spans.
In summary, so long as a task switch specifically requires that a task-set be
activated in order to perform the correct task then executive capacity can predict
individual task switching costs. Given the evidence in the literature that working
memory capacity tasks rely on executive control (e.g. Conway, Cohen, & Bunting,
2001; Kane, 2001; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2001; for
review see Kane, 2002), this finding strongly suggests that task switching requires input
from executive resources.
1.3.5 Evidence from Neuroscientific studies for the role of executive processes in task
switching
There is wide agreement that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a role in executive
control, including the coordination of goal-directed behaviour (Brass & Von Cramon,
2004; Dreher & Berman, 2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001), and maintenance of relevant
information in the face of interference (Kane & Engle, 2002). Indeed, findings suggest
that PFC neurons can maintain task-relevant information (Fuster, 1995), which is not
affected by interference from distraction (Miller, Ericksen, & Desimone, 1996), and
PFC sends projections to much of the neocortex (e.g. Pandya & Barnes, 1987; Pandya
& Yeterian, 1990) suggesting PFC meets many of the requirements for executive
control and the control of task switching. If task switching involves input from
executive control then brain-imaging studies should find activation in this area during
task switching, compared to task repetition.
Increased activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been
associated with switch versus pure trials (Braver, Reynolds and Donaldson, 2003;23
MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, and Carter, 2000) as well as activation in the inferior
frontal junction (Brass and Von Cramon, 2002). Imaging has also shown increased
activity in PFC associated with voluntary task preparation before a switch (Luks,
Simpson, Feiwell, and Miller, 2002; Sohn, Ursa, Anderson, Stenger, and Carter, 2000),
suggesting PFC activation is specifically associated with executive control in task
switching. Further, Garavan et al. (2002) found that greater activation in the left PFC
was associated with trials where subjects were more successful at holding a task-set in
memory, suggesting that PFC activation could be associated with activating and
maintaining task-sets. Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, and Cohen (2006) found regions of
the PFC which showed increased activation only when switching was to a particular
task, possibly reflecting the maintenance of task-relevant information; as well as regions
associated with more global control processes, such as task coordination, which were
unaffected by the task switched to.
More specific evidence suggesting how top-down executive processes control
task switching comes from a neuroimaging study comparing BOLD responses to task-
sequence ABA versus ABC (Dreher & Berman, 2002). Behavioural data has found
greater switch costs when performing sequence ABA than ABC, suggesting inhibition
is applied by executive functions when switching from a task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). In
support of the interpretation of the behavioural data, increased activity was found in the
DLPFC associated with the sequence ABA than ABC.
Additional evidence supporting a role of prefrontal executive control in task
switching comes from the finding that activity in two areas of the PFC (anterior
cingulated cortex/pre-sensory motor area, and posterior cingulate) correlated with
behavioural switching costs: larger switch costs occurred when activity was greater in
these areas of the PFC (Yeung et al., 2006), suggesting that increased switch costs were24
associated with instances when PFC was under greater demand. Interestingly, Yeung
and colleagues also revealed that activity associated with the currently irrelevant task
was directly associated with increased task switching costs. For example, on trials when
the irrelevant task was a face task, the RT cost of switching to the other task increased
as activation in the area associated with task-irrelevant face processing increased. This
finding offers support for the commonly held contention that interference between tasks
is a major contributor to the task switch cost.
The Neuroimaging evidence presented suggests frontal executive areas are
associated with executive control and the control of task switching, supporting our
hypothesis.
Evidence for the role of frontal cortex in task switching also comes from several
studies that have shown that left frontal patients demonstrated greater switch costs than
controls (Aron, Monsell, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004; Keele & Rafal, 2000; Rogers,
Sahakian, Hodges, Polkey, Kennard, & Robbins, 1998). Frontal patients also show
impairments in tasks heavily involving components of task switching. These include:
inhibition of task-sets and/or responses (Aron et al., 2004; Cohen, Barch, Carter,
Servan-Schreiber, 1999); sustaining attention (Wilkins, Shallice, & McCarthy, 1987);
switching attention in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Milner, 1963; Ravizza &
Ciranni, 2002); as well as the coordination of multiple tasks and the
formulation/maintenance of task goals in real-life multiple sub-goal tasks (Shallice &
Burgess, 1991). The neuropsychological evidence presented suggests a causal role for
frontal executive areas in the control of task switching.25
1.3.6 Switch costs with stimuli affording only one task
If executive processes control switching between tasks above and beyond resolving
interference between competing task-sets, then a switch cost should be found when
switching between any two tasks, even with entirely different stimulus sets and response
mappings. Many authors argue that in order for there to be large and consistent switch
costs, there must be overlap between stimuli (e.g. Allport et al., 1994, Experiment 4;
Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). The
basis of this argument is that a large contributor to switch costs is the interference when
performing the current task caused by the stimulus cueing, in a bottom-up manner, both
the current and the previous task-sets (e.g. Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). Indeed,
when the stimulus is not associated with both task-sets task switch costs are often
eliminated or, at the very least, reduced to an almost negligible amount (Allport et al.,
1994, Experiment 4; Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976).
Another way in which priming can add to switching costs when stimuli are
bivalent is to do with the variation of an irrelevant element of the target stimulus. For
example, in Allport et al.’s (1994) experiments, when the relevant stimulus dimension
(word identity, e.g. RED/BLUE) varied there was also variation in the irrelevant
stimulus dimension (ink colour). The need to filter out this variation is know as Garner
filtering (Garner, 1970; 1974). In the task switching paradigm when a stimulus affords
two tasks Garner filtering may contribute to the switch costs because this filtering will
be greater on trials where a switch has been made from the other task, in which case the
irrelevant stimulus dimension has recently been primed (Rubin & Meiran, 2005). Rubin
and Meiran (2005, Experiment 1) showed that switch performance was marginally
significantly facilitated (i.e. switch costs were reduced) when there was no variation in
the irrelevant stimulus dimension. This became a significant effect when only trials with26
no preparation were analysed, strongly suggesting that these priming effects contribute
to the switching cost, especially when there is no time for the dissipation of activation
associated with the irrelevant stimulus attribute which was relevant in the previous task.
In some cases (e.g. when the switch is unpredictable and a cue is used to
introduce a task switch) task switch costs may also be attributable to the extra time
taken in switch trials to discriminate and interpret the cue regarding which task to
perform (Monsell, 2003). These interference effects, due to conflicting response
mappings to the same stimulus, would slow down RTs in the same manner as would
making a single task more complex, without assuming any increase in the recruitment
of executive control processes.
Despite these contributions to the switch cost, which rely on stimuli which
afford both of the tasks switched between, switch costs have occasionally been observed
with stimuli which are only associated with one task-set (Allport et al. 1994; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995, Rubin & Meiran, 2006). Rogers and Monsell (1995, experiment 1)
found a substantial switch cost of over 200 ms with character pairs only associated with
one task-set, consisting of the task-relevant character as well as a task-neutral character:
the irrelevant character did not afford the other task, although note here that the
irrelevant character still varied across trials and as such still required Garner filtering.
Allport et al. (1994, Experiment 4) also found small but consistent switch costs for
univalent neutral Stroop stimuli (e.g. coloured X’s for the colour naming task), although
they also revealed situations in which univalent stimuli led to no switch costs.
Interestingly, in this case there was no opportunity for Garner filtering so priming could
not have contributed to the switch cost. In both these studies switch costs associated
with stimuli affording only one task were significantly smaller than the costs associated27
with those affording both tasks, probably reflecting the role played by activation of
irrelevant task-sets in switch costs.
A recent study by Rubin and Meiran (2005), however, revealed similar switch
costs when switching between tasks with overlapping stimuli, and those with stimuli
which were entirely unrelated, strongly suggesting that, at least in their study, large and
significant task switch costs can occur when stimuli do not afford both tasks. This study
is discussed in more detail in the introduction to Chapter 3.
In summary, although attempts have been made to reveal significant task switch
costs with stimuli which are entirely separate for both tasks, only one study has so far
revealed large and significant task switching costs when stimuli for the two tasks do not
overlap. My current hypothesis concerns the effect of executive control involved in a
switch between any two tasks on task performance, and as such predicts large and
consistent task switching costs when there is no overlap between task stimuli. As such,
in the current study task switching will be measured using two tasks which do not
overlap in their stimuli (Experiments 1 & 2) and, later, do not overlap in both their
stimuli or responses (Experiments 3 – 14, see introduction to Chapter 3). I expect to find
large and significant switch costs under these conditions.
1.4 TASK SWITCHING AND DISTRACTOR INTERFERENCE IN SELECTIVE
ATTENTION TASKS
1.4.1 Effects of task switching on distractor interference
A study by Rogers and Monsell (1995, Experiment 1) reports findings relating task
switching to greater interference from irrelevant information. In this study there were
greater switch costs to stimulus pairs with a target and a response-incongruent irrelevant28
character (350 ms) versus a response-congruent irrelevant character (309 ms). Both
tasks required the same response-mappings, making it hard to interpret whether the
increased switch cost was due to a specific effect of having to change the response-
mapping (so that the target response is less certain and thus more open to interference
by an irrelevant, incongruent distractor), or whether the effect is due to a general
demand on executive control leading to greater distractibility during task switching, as
hypothesised by load theory. Interestingly, in this study no distractor effect was found in
the non–switch condition and thus the increased distractor interference in the task
switch condition, which involved 4 versus 2 response mappings, may merely have been
due to the response-stimulus associations being more vulnerable to distraction, and not
the increase in executive demand.
A series of studies carried out by Lavie and colleagues (2000; 2004) provide
more direct support for the contention that switching between tasks loads executive
processes and increases interference from distractors. In some of the experiments
carried out by Lavie and colleagues, manipulating working memory load involved
increased demand on dual-task coordination. Working memory load was often
manipulated by comparing low load blocks, in which the memory sets were the same on
all trials (e.g. always “6789”), and high load blocks, in which subjects were requested to
maintain a different memory set on each trial (e.g. “4672”). In the low load condition it
is possible that the working memory task was not performed, but rather participants
responded based on their long-term memory of the memory set for that block. Thus low
load blocks may have simply involved performance of the selective attention task,
compared to high load blocks, where performance of both the selective attention task
and the working memory task was required. In this way there was a difference in the29
high versus low blocks in terms of the executive load of dual-task coordination, which
could explain the greater distraction revealed in high load blocks.
Lavie et al. (2004, experiments 4 & 5) investigated the effects of successive
dual-task performance on distractor rejection. Greater interference effects were found
from distractors in a selective attention flanker task (incongruent – congruent trials)
when performing first a working memory task, and then a selective attention flanker
task (dual-task condition), than when performing the selective attention flanker task
alone (single-task condition, same procedure except did not respond to working
memory task). These experiments provide some indirect support for the hypothesis that
task switching should lead to greater distractor interference because the dual-task
conditions required switching from the working memory task to the flanker task.
However, these experiments combined a working memory task with the flanker task and
as such their findings may also be explained by increased working memory load in the
dual-task conditions due to working memory not entirely ‘clearing up’ by the time the
flanker task appeared. Thus, in the current study I aim to investigate the effects on
distractor processing of executive load caused by task switching per se.
1.4.2 Effects of task switching on reaction times and distractor interference in the
absence of executive load
Although there is much empirical support for the involvement of executive control in
task switching, and given that only one previous study has found task switching costs
when both stimuli and responses do not overlap, my current study may not produce
significant task switching costs, or may not load enough on executive control in order to
produce increased distractibility. If this is the case, then different outcomes might be
expected. The effects of parallel versus serial processing in switch versus pure blocks,30
and greater carryover effects of the distractor part of the display in pure than switch
blocks both might result in increased distractor interference in pure rather than switch
blocks, contrary to the current hypothesis. It is also possible that in the absence of
executive control requirements, the RTs in the current experiment involving irrelevant
stimulus dimensions, might be increased in pure than switch blocks. I will discuss each
of these possibilities in turn.
The response selection bottleneck theory of the psychological refractory period
(Pashler, 1984; 1994; Pashler & Johnston, 1989) contends that whilst perceptual
processing and response preparation can occur in parallel, a central processing stage
responsible for response selection occurs serially, so that the response for the first task
must be selected before the response to the second task. More recently, authors have
argued that these limitations are not structural, but rather are strategic, for example,
serial processing has been argued to be invoked under situations demanding executive
control, such as in the presence of cross talk and increased error probability (e.g. Logan
& Gordan, 2001; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; 1997b). Luria and Meiran (2005) argue that
task switching versus task repetition in the psychological refractory period (PRP)
paradigm, involves greater executive load and as such results in more serial processing
(see also Oriet & Jolicoeur, 2003). If task switching instigates partly serial processing
then it is to be expected that distractor interference will decrease under task switching
conditions compared to pure blocks.
Another possible difference between switch and pure blocks which would
predict greater distractor interference in pure compared to switch blocks is based on the
Garner filtering effect (Garner, 1970; 1974). As previously discussed, the presence of an
irrelevant stimulus dimension which varies on every trial may require executive control
in order to filter out the irrelevant trial variance. In switch trials in the current31
experiments the irrelevant dimension has not been associated with a relevant response
(i.e. an X distractor in the present trial is associated with an X target for a previous trial)
for at least one trial (because a trial of the second task intervenes). However, in the pure
blocks the irrelevant dimension will on average have been associated with an opposite
but previously relevant response more recently. As such, in pure trials the executive
control elicited to filter the irrelevant stimulus dimension may be greater than in switch
trials, resulting in longer responses to incongruent versus congruent trials in pure versus
switch blocks.
Lastly, and similarly to the above, if carryover effects of the irrelevant stimulus
dimension, such as increased interference from the triggering of recently relevant but
opposite responses, are present, and if the executive control involved in switching is
small due to the absence of stimuli which cue both task-sets, then it might be expected
that responses in the pure blocks would be longer than the responses in the switch
blocks.
1.5 CURRENT STUDY: THE EFFECT OF TASK SWITCHING ON DISTRACTOR
INTERFERENCE IN SELECTIVE ATTENTION TASKS
Participants performed a flanker task either alone, or when switching between that task
and another task. In the flanker task subjects made speeded responses to a target letter
and a distractor letter appeared in the periphery. Both letters were either an X or a Z,
creating two different conditions; one where the distractor letter was the same as the
target letter (congruent); and one where it was the other letter (incongruent, e.g. target is
‘x’, distractor is ‘z’). The difference between the reaction times to the incongruent and32
the congruent trials is taken as a measure of the amount of interference caused by the
distractor letter on the processing of the target letter.
Load on executive control resources was manipulated by switching between
tasks (high load), or repeating performance of the same task (low load). Jersild’s (1927)
original task switching method of comparing two block types, pure and alternating, was
used (with the exception of Chapter 4). Interference effects from the distractors in the
flanker task and attentional capture task were compared in switch as opposed to pure
trials.
Each task had it’s own unique stimuli, and thus stimuli only afforded one task.
As discussed previously, this was in order to more directly measure the hypothesis that
a switch between any two tasks should load on executive control, for example to
coordinate switching and activate/inhibit task-sets, and as such result in significant task
switch costs and reduced selective attention performance.
I predict that greater interference from irrelevant distractors in the flanker task
will be found under conditions of high executive load, i.e. in the switch as opposed to
pure trials.
In Chapter 2 I aim to provide support for the hypothesis that task switching
reduces selective attention performance by comparing distractor interference in the
flanker task when it is performed in a task switch as opposed to task repeat (pure) block.
I then generalise the effect of task switching on distractor interference to a task which
does not have a response congruency element, and investigate the effects of task
switching on attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton.
In Chapter 3 I investigate the effects of response mappings on the interaction
between task switching and distractor interference in both the flanker task and
attentional capture task. Task responses for the two tasks are separated first onto four33
separate response keys, and then so that each hand responds only to one task. In this
way interference between the response-mappings of the two task-sets is minimised.
The effects of task mixing and task switching on distractor interference are then
investigated in Chapter 4. Pure and switch trials are performed within the same block,
so that the effects of between block differences are reduced and distractor interference
effects can be more specifically attributed to task switching per se.
Task unrelated thoughts are another form of distraction thought to rely on
executive input. In Chapter 5 the opposite effect of task switching on interference from
external distractors and internal distractors is revealed.
Finally, in Chapter 6 the influence of individual differences in working memory
capacity on task switch costs and distractor interference effects in the flanker task is
used to further provide support for the hypothesis that both task switching and distractor
interference draw on a shared executive resource.34
CHAPTER 2
Distractor Interference During Task Switching35
2.1 EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, distractor effects were compared in a flanker task under task switch
and task repeat conditions. Participants were required either to switch between a visual
search task and a flanker task (switch blocks), or to repeatedly perform only one of
these tasks (pure blocks). The hypothesis that the demands placed by task switching on
executive control reduce it’s availability to control attention leads to the prediction that
distractor interference in the flanker task will increase in task switch blocks compared to
pure blocks.
2.1.1 Method
Participants. Ten participants (18-35) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
from University College London were paid to participate.
Stimuli and Apparatus. The experiment was run on a PC with a 12” SVGA
monitor and a standard 102 keyboard. E-Prime version 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools
Inc.) was used to create the stimuli, run the experiment and collect the data. The visual
search task displays consisted of a circle of red shapes (located with a 2.1 radius from
fixation to the centre of each shape) made up of four diamonds (1.4 point to point) and
one target circle (1.2 diameter) presented on a black background. The target circle was
equally likely to appear in each of the five positions. Each shape had a white line (0.5° x
0.15°) inside it, either vertically or horizontally aligned. The alignment of the line in
each shape was randomly assigned. The flanker task stimuli were a target letter,
appearing in one of six positions (3 to the left and 3 to the right of fixation, with a
separation of 0.7 between each possible position), and a distractor letter appearing
above or below fixation (1.7 from fixation to distractor edge). The target letter was36
either X or Z and subtended 0.4 (width) x 0.65 (height) of visual angle. The distractor
letter was also either an X or a Z and subtended 0.5 (width) x 0.8 (height) of visual
angle. The target letter and distractor letter were both 0.1 of visual angle in thickness.
All letters were presented in white on a black background. There were two conditions in
the flanker task; congruent, where the target and distractor were both the same (i.e. both
X or both Z), and incongruent, where the distractor letter was a different letter to the
target (i.e. target is X and distractor is Z; target is Z and distractor is X). Congruent and
incongruent trials were randomised within blocks.
Procedure. The switch block trials consisted of the sequence shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: An example of the procedure in a switch block. In pure blocks the procedure
for one task repeats.
Flanker Task
150 ms
+
+
Fixation
500 ms
Stimulus
Until response
Feedback
500 ms
X
Z
Fixation
500 ms
Feedback
500 ms
Stimulus
Until response
Visual Search Task
Time37
For both tasks a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms, followed by the stimulus, which
remained on the screen until response. Subjects pressed the 0 key on the number pad if
the target letter in the flanker task was an X or if the line in the circle in the visual
search task was horizontal, and the 2 key on the number pad if the flanker target was a Z
or if the line inside the circle was vertical. Responses were made with the index and
middle fingers of the right hand respectively. Feedback was a blank screen for 50 ms
and a short auditory beep occurred in this time for an incorrect or no response, and this
was followed by a blank screen of 150 ms.
In the flanker task target location, target identity (x or z) and congruency
(congruent/incongruent) were counterbalanced to randomly occur with equal
probability. In the visual search task target location and line orientation randomly
occurred with equal probability.
Each block consisted of 80 trials mixed at random. In the switch blocks 40
randomly selected trials of each task were presented alternately (ABAB…). To match
the number of trials for each task in the switch and pure conditions each subject
performed 6 blocks of switch trials, and 3 pure blocks each of the two tasks. This
created a total of 480 trials for each task: 240 in the pure and 240 in the switch blocks.
A total of 12 experimental blocks were run, preceded by 2 practice blocks, one for each
task, with 20 trials in each. Subjects did not practice switching between the tasks.
Participants alternated between pure and switch blocks, half started with a pure block
(half pure A and half pure B), and half started with a switch block followed by a pure
block (half pure A and half pure B). The four block orders were counter-balanced across
participants.38
2.1.2 Results
Mean reaction times (RTs) and percentage error rates were calculated for each subject
as a function of task condition (switch/pure) and distractor congruency in the flanker
task (congruent/incongruent). Incorrect response trials and those longer then 2 s were
excluded from the RT analysis in this experiment as well as in all the other experiments
reported
1.
Table 1: Reaction times for the visual search task and the flanker task as a function of
task condition (pure/switch) and congruency (congruent/incongruent).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task Visual Search Task
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 562 (158) 579 (163) 544 (153) 35 736 (158)
Errors (%) 4.5 6 3 3 6
Switch
RT (ms) 766 (238) 808 (249) 724 (228) 84 882 (209)
Errors (%) 5 6 4 2 6
Task switch cost
RT (ms) 204 146
Errors (%) 0.5 0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = incongruent, C = Congruent.
Visual search task. RTs were increased in the task switch versus pure blocks, F
(1, 9) = 30.9, MSE = 3909.9, p < 0.001. Percentage error rates were the same in both
task conditions (F < 1; see Table 1).
1 The percentage of trials lost was smaller than 10% in all experiments.39
Flanker task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (congruency) within-subjects ANOVA
performed on the flanker task RT data revealed longer RTs in switch than pure blocks,
F (1, 9) = 49.5, MSE = 8438.0, p < 0.001, and longer RTs to incongruent versus
congruent trials, F (1, 9) = 43.0, MSE = 821.6, p < 0.001, in the flanker task (see Table
1).
Critically, the significant interaction between switch and congruency, F (1, 9) =
35.9, MSE = 160.9, p < 0.001, indicated a larger congruency effect in switch versus
pure trials in the flanker task, as predicted.
Since task switching led to slower RTs overall, congruency effects were also
calculated as percentages of congruent trial RTs. A comparison of the percentage
distractor effects between task conditions confirmed a significant increase from the pure
(5%) to the switch (12%) blocks, t (9) = 4.8, SEM = 0.011, p < 0.001. This makes an
account of the increase in distraction effects in the switch than pure blocks in terms of
the scaling of RTs in the switch versus pure blocks unlikely.
An error ANOVA revealed a main effect of congruency, F (1, 9) = 5.7, MSE =
0.001, p < 0.05, with more errors in the incongruent trials, but no main effect of switch,
F (1, 9) = 3.0, MSE = 0.000, p = 0.12, in the flanker task. There was no interaction
between task condition and congruency in error rates in the flanker task (F < 1).
Key switch analysis. Switching tasks but repeating the same key press may
require more input from executive control due to the need to reconfigure the response-
mapping to the new task and inhibit the response for the previous task. Thus, one might
expect a greater switch cost for these switches than for those involving a key switch.
Indeed, there was a trend towards greater switch cost for switches involving no key
switch (M = 202 ms) versus those involving a key switch (M = 182 ms), however, a 2
(task switch) by 2 (key switch) within subjects ANOVA was performed on the flanker40
task RT data and this interaction did not reach significance, F < 1: Switch costs were not
significantly increased when the current task involved the same key response to the
previous task versus a different key response.
In conclusion, Experiment 1 provides preliminary support for the hypothesis that
task switching leads to greater distraction in selective attention tasks. Experiment 1
supports the novel suggestion that the detrimental effects of task switching are not only
restricted to slowed RTs, but that task switching also results in increased distractibility
in the tasks switched between.
2.2 EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2 I examine whether the effect of task switching on distractor
interference could be generalised to another measure of distractor interference, which
does not involve a response congruency manipulation. In Experiment 2 participants
switched between an attentional capture task (similar to the visual search task used in
Experiment 1, except that a singleton occurred in 50% of the trials), and a simple
choice-response task (similar to the flanker task except with a neutral distractor).
Longer RTs in singleton present than singleton absent trials (an attentional capture
effect) would reveal that the singleton has captured attention away from the primary
task (Theeuwes, 1991; 1992; 1994). Increased attentional capture in switch versus pure
blocks would generalise the findings of Experiment 1 and support the hypothesis that
task switching increases interference from distractors in two different types of task.
The hypothesis that task switching will reduce the ability to attend to targets and
ignore distractors leads to the prediction that greater attentional capture will be found in
switch (versus pure) trials, even though this task does not involve response competition.41
2.2.1 Method
Participants. Eight participants (18-35) from University College London, all
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were paid for their participation.
Stimuli. The flanker task was used as in Experiment 1 except that the target now
subtended 0.6° x 0.4° of visual angle, and the distractor (which was always a neutral
letter P) subtended 0.9° x 0.5°. The distance between the six possible positions of the
target was 0.7° and the distractor appeared 1.7 (from fixation to distractor edge) above
or below fixation. The attentional capture task was similar to the visual search task in
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: the stimulus was a circle of 9 shapes
(radius: 3.3 of visual angle) made up of 8 diamond shapes and one circle shape. On
half of the trials a colour singleton (one of the diamond non-targets presented in a
different colour) was present in the display. The shapes could either be all green or all
red, with the singleton appearing in the opposite colour (e.g. all green with red
singleton). This added uncertainty as to the colour of the singleton and prevented
subjects ignoring, for example, any green stimulus on each trial. In order to create
uncertainty about the locations of the stimuli three different presentations of the stimuli
were used. Each presentation was the same except that the circle of shapes was rotated
clockwise by 0.5° in the second presentation, and 1° in the third presentation. Colour,
display orientation, line orientation and singleton present/absent were randomised
within blocks. Otherwise the block types and block orders were the same as in
Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1, except that
to reduce overall experiment time no 150 ms blank screen appeared after each task
response.42
2.2.2 Results
The mean RTs and percentage error rates for each subject as a function of task condition
(switch/pure) and singleton presence in the attentional capture task (present/absent) are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Reaction times for the attentional capture task and the flanker task as a function
of task condition (pure/switch) and singleton presence (present/absent).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional Capture Task Flanker Task
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 763 (100) 784 (111) 742 (89) 42 500 (46)
Errors (%) 4 5 3 2 3
Switch
RT (ms) 869 (112) 918 (125) 820 (99) 98 667 (104)
Errors (%) 5 5 5 0 3
Task switch cost
RT (ms) 106 167
Errors (%) 1 0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Singleton present, A = Singleton absent.
Flanker task. As shown in Table 2, the flanker task RTs were increased under
switch (vs. pure conditions), F (1, 7) = 54.9, MSE = 2045.4, p < 0.001. There was no
significant difference between the error rates in the pure versus switch conditions, F < 1.
Attentional capture task. Two 2 (task condition) x 2 (singleton presence) within-
subject ANOVAs were performed on the attentional capture RTs and percentage error
rates. RTs were longer for switch than pure trials, F (1, 7) = 21.7, MSE = 4121.0, p <43
0.01, and for singleton present versus singleton absent trials, F (1, 7) = 36.2, MSE =
1097.0, p < 0.001 (Table 2).
Critically, there was a significant interaction between task condition
(switch/nonswitch) and singleton presence (present/absent), F (1, 7) = 10.4, MSE =
590.0, p < 0.01: A greater effect of singleton presence was found in switch trials than
pure trials. Again, because the overall RTs increased in switch versus pure blocks,
singleton effects were recalculated as proportions of singleton absent RTs and were still
significantly greater in switch than pure trials, t (7) = -3.1, SEM = 0.020, p < 0.01,
suggesting this increase in singleton effects was not attributable to the overall increase
in RTs in switch versus pure blocks.
The error ANOVA revealed no difference between errors for pure and switch
trials, F < 1, nor between singleton present versus singleton absent trials, F < 1,
although a significant interaction in the errors between task condition and singleton
presence, F (1, 7) = 7.6, MSE = 0.000, p < 0.05, showed a greater effect of capture on
errors in the pure than switch blocks. Table 2 clearly shows that this interaction is due to
less errors being made in the pure absent condition, as would be predicted.
Experiment 2 provides further support for the hypothesis that task switching
results in reduced ability to attend to a target and discard distractors from entering
higher levels of processing.
2.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION
The experiments in Chapter 2 established that task switching increases distractibility in
both a response competition flanker task and an attentional capture task. This provides
preliminary support for the hypothesis that distractor interference effects will be44
increased under task switch versus task repeat conditions. Increasing executive demand
via the need to switch between two tasks resulted in increased distractor interference,
suggesting that the executive resource loaded in task switching is also required to
control distractor rejection in selective attention tasks, establishing support for Lavie’s
load theory of executive control as a late attentional selection mechanism.45
CHAPTER 3
Response Mappings, Task Switching, and
Distractor Interference46
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I investigate the effect of task switching on distractor interference when
the two tasks do not overlap in either their stimuli or their responses. As reviewed in the
general introduction, with the exception of a recent study by Rubin and Meiran (2005),
in previous studies the RT cost of switching between two tasks, which is attributed to
the involvement of executive control in task switching, has only been revealed for
switches between tasks overlapping in either stimuli (Meiran, 2000), response-mappings
(Meiran, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995, Experiment 4; Ruthruff, Remington &
Johnston, 2001; Sumner & Ahmed, 2006), or more typically both (e.g. Rogers &
Monsell, 1995). Indeed, in studies finding significant switch costs with task stimuli
which do not overlap (Allport et al., 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995, for review see
general introduction), there was overlap between the response-mappings for the two
tasks, such that each response key was mapped to a response from both tasks. Due to
the potential interference between response-mappings under these situations the switch
costs in these studies may be due at least in part to the specific need to reconfigure
stimulus-response mapping and inhibit current stimulus-response associations when
switching from one task to another. Although these functions are likely to involve
executive control, it is also possible to account for at least some of the RT cost
associated with task switching in such a paradigm on the basis of the specific
interference due to cross-talk, and potential negative effects of priming of the wrong
response between conflicting response-mappings to the same stimulus (Allport &
Wylie, 1999; 2000).
In support of the contribution of response-mapping overlap to task switch costs,
Meiran (2000) revealed that overlap in response-mappings affected the switch cost, with47
responses associated with both tasks appearing to account for the residual switch cost.
However, large task switch costs revealed even when response-mappings do not overlap
(Hester & Garavan, 2005) suggest response-mapping overlap is not a necessary
prerequisite for task switch costs, although Hester and Garavan’s study still presented
stimuli affording both tasks, and thus task switch costs in this paradigm could still be
contributed to by interference between task-sets related to the same stimulus.
So far none of the studies reviewed above and in the general introduction have
revealed large and consistent task switching costs when both the stimuli and the
responses are only associated with one task. The act of switching between two tasks,
including monitoring correct task performance, activating/inhibiting task-sets,
coordinating the two tasks, and shifting processing resources from one task-set to
another, should involve executive control resources, regardless of whether the stimuli or
the response-mappings for the two task-sets overlap.
In a recent study, Rubin and Meiran (2005) revealed large and consistent task
switching costs when both stimuli and responses for each task afforded that task alone,
and were unrelated to the other task. Switch costs for switches between these two tasks
cannot be contributed to by factors related to re-mapping responses to the same key, nor
stimulus-response mappings to the same stimulus, nor by interference from previous
response-mappings on current response mappings due to both being activated by the
same stimulus. Interestingly, in this paradigm task switch costs with stimuli affording
both tasks were not significantly greater than those revealed for stimuli affording only
one task. This study establishes that there can be large and significant task switch costs
even when the stimuli and responses for the two tasks are entirely unrelated.
The experiments in the current chapter offer more direct support for the
hypothesis that loading executive resources via task switching will increase distractor48
interference. Task switches between two different tasks that share neither stimuli nor
responses should tap more clearly into the higher-level executive control functions that
are stipulated in load theory to be involved in distractor rejection. Specifically, Lavie
(2000; Lavie et al., 2004) hypothesised that the demands placed on executive control
when subjects need to coordinate two tasks involving different stimulus-processing
priorities would detract from the availability of executive control to ensure that
irrelevant low-priority distractors do not intrude on task performance.
Thus, this chapter aims to replicate the findings of greater distractor interference
under task switch (versus task repeat) conditions, with both non-overlapping stimuli (as
in Experiments 1 and 2) and non-overlapping response-mappings.
3.2 EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 examines whether the findings of Experiment 1 can be replicated with
different response-mappings for the two tasks. My hypothesis that task switching should
impair the ability to ignore irrelevant distractors leads to the prediction that distractor
interference in the flanker task will be greater in the task switching blocks than in the
pure blocks, even when there is no overlap between the two task-sets in respect of
stimuli or response-mappings.
3.2.1 Method
Participants. Nineteen undergraduates (18-35) from University College London
participated. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their
participation.49
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment
1. The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 1, with the exception that the
response-mappings for the two tasks were mapped to four different keys as opposed to
the same two keys. In the flanker task participants pressed ‘C’ (with the index finger of
the left hand) if the target letter was a Z, and ‘5’ on the numerical key pad (with the
middle finger of the right hand) if the target letter was an X. In the visual search task
subjects were asked to press ‘D’ (with the middle finger of the left hand) if the line in
the circle was vertical, and ‘1’ (with the index finger of the right hand) if it was
horizontal.
3.2.2 Results
The mean RTs and percentage error rates as a function of the experimental conditions
are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Mean RTs for the flanker task and the visual search task as a function of task
condition (pure/switch) and congruency (congruent/incongruent).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task Visual Search Task
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 658 (148) 690 (168) 627 (132) 63 812 (184)
Errors (%) 6 8 5 3 3
Switch
RT (ms) 912 (156) 971 (181) 853 (138) 118 980 (191)
Errors (%) 6.5 7 6 1 6
Switch cost
RT (ms) 254 168
Errors (%) 0.5 3
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = incongruent, C = Congruent.50
Visual search task. As can be seen in Table 3 the visual search RTs were longer
in switch blocks than in pure blocks, F (1, 18) = 81.3, MSE = 3270, p < 0.001, thus
establishing a significant task switching cost, and more errors were committed in switch
than pure blocks, F (1, 18) = 21.2, MSE = 0.000, p < 0.001.
Flanker task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (congruency) within-subject ANOVA on
the RTs revealed longer RTs in the switch versus pure blocks, F (1, 18) = 81.0, MSE =
15112, p < 0.001, and in the incongruent versus congruent distractor conditions, F (1,
18) = 39.5, MSE = 3960, p < 0.001, revealing both a significant task switching cost and
a significant effect of the congruency of the distractor on target RTs.
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between distractor congruency
and task condition, F (1, 18) = 17.0, MSE = 837, p < 0.001: there were greater distractor
effects in the task switch than in the pure task conditions (see Table 3) as predicted. As
in previous experiments, because RTs were longer in switch than pure blocks,
congruency effects were calculated as the percentage of the individual RT in the
congruent distractor condition (M = 10% for pure blocks; M = 14% for switch blocks)
and the interaction between task condition and congruency remained significant, t (18)
= -2.3, SEM = 0.02, p < 0.05, thus making an account of the greater congruency effect
in switch versus pure blocks in terms of a simple scaling effect unlikely.
The error ANOVA replicated the congruency effect, F (1, 18) = 6.2, MSE =
0.001, p < 0.05, with more errors committed in the incongruent than congruent trials.
There was no effect of task switching on the error rates (F < 1). A numerical trend for a
greater effect of congruency on errors in the pure than switch trials (2%) was revealed,
but this did not reach significance, F (1, 18) = 4.2, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.06.
In conclusion, the findings suggest that switching between two tasks (as opposed
to repeating performance of the same task) creates greater distraction in a selective51
attention task, even when the task-sets of the two tasks do not overlap in their stimuli,
nor in their responses.
3.3 EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 aimed to replicate greater attentional capture from an irrelevant singleton
in a visual search task when switching versus repeating tasks in conditions where the
task-sets for the two tasks do not overlap in their response-mappings.
3.3.1 Method
Participants. Eight undergraduates from University College London aged
between 18 and 30 and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were paid for their
participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2. The
procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 2 but with one difference: Responses
to the two tasks were mapped to different keys in the same way as in Experiment 3.
3.3.2 Results
Mean RTs and error rates were calculated for each subject as a function of task
condition (switch/pure) and singleton presence in the attentional capture task
(present/absent) and can be seen in Table 4.52
Table 4: RTs for the attentional capture task and the flanker task as a function of task
condition (pure/switch) and singleton presence (present/absent).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional Capture Task Flanker Task
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 716 (100) 735 (106) 696 (94) 39 465 (77)
Errors (%) 7 7 7 0 6
Switch
RT (ms) 957 (196) 998 (205) 916 (186) 82 719 (128)
Errors (%) 4 4 4 0 4
Task switch cost
RT (ms) 241 254
Errors (%) - 3 -2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Singleton present, A = Singleton absent.
Flanker task. As shown in Table 4, flanker task RTs were increased under switch
(vs. pure) conditions, F (1, 7) = 115.4, MSE = 2247.6, p < 0.001, showing a significant
task switching cost. Task condition was marginally significant in the error rates, F (1, 7)
= 5.2, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.06, with more errors occurring in the pure blocks. As can be
seen in Table 4 this was a small effect (2%) and as such is unlikely to reflect a speed-
accuracy trade off large enough to explain the increase in RTs revealed in switch versus
pure blocks.
Attentional capture task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (singleton presence) within-
subject ANOVA performed on the attentional capture RTs revealed significantly longer
RTs in switch than pure trials, F (1, 7) = 30.7, MSE = 15185.4, p < 0.001, and
significantly greater RTs for singleton present versus singleton absent trials, F (1, 7) =53
28.0, MSE = 1046.4, p < 0.001: significant task switch costs and attentional capture
effects were revealed.
Critically, there was a significant interaction between task condition
(switch/nonswitch) and singleton presence (present/absent), F (1, 7) = 22.9, MSE =
163.7, p < 0.01. As illustrated in Table 4 this interaction reflects greater singleton
capture effects in the switch than nonswitch blocks, as predicted. As in previous
experiments, when the singleton effect was re-calculated as a proportion of singleton
absent RTs the interaction remained significant (M = 6% for pure blocks; M = 9% for
switch blocks), t (7) = -3.4, SEM = 0.010, p < 0.05, thus the effect of task condition on
congruency effects is unlikely to result from a scaling effect due to increased RTs in the
switch versus pure blocks.
An error ANOVA revealed only a main effect of task condition, F (1, 7) = 14.8,
MSE = 0.00, p < 0.01, with greater errors in pure than switch trials (F < 1 for both the
main effect of singleton presence and for the task condition versus singleton presence
interaction). This 3% effect is not considerable enough to satisfactorily explain greater
RTs in switch versus pure blocks as merely a speed-accuracy trade off. Additionally, to
pre-empt further experiments, these results are replicated (Chapter 5, Experiment 13)
without the presence of greater errors in pure versus switch trials, suggesting that a
speed-accuracy trade-off is not responsible for the increased RTs in switch versus pure
blocks in this experiment.
In conclusion, Experiment 4 replicated the findings of Experiment 2, showing
greater interference effects from the irrelevant singleton in an attentional capture task in
switch versus pure blocks; even when the task sets of the two tasks do not overlap in
either response-mappings or stimuli. The results support the prediction that task54
switching increases distraction even when the tasks switched between overlap in neither
stimuli nor responses.
3.4 EXPERIMENT 5
Experiment 5 investigates the effect on distractor interference of switching between two
tasks when responses to the two tasks are mapped to separate hands, so that the
responses to one task are mapped to one hand and the responses to the other task are
mapped to the other hand. The aim was to replicate the greater flanker effects in switch
than pure blocks revealed by previous experiments, but with the responses to the flanker
task mapped to the left hand and the responses to the visual search task mapped to the
right hand. In this way, there is no overlap between the effecters of the responses for the
two tasks.
3.4.1 Method
Participants. Eight undergraduates (18 to 30, with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision) from University College London received payment in return for their
participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 3. The
procedure was the same as Experiment 3, with the exception that responses to the two
tasks were mapped to not only different keys, but also different hands. In the flanker
task responses were made with the left hand, pressing the Z key if the target letter was a
Z; pressing the X key if the target letter was an X. In the attentional capture task
participants responded with the right hand, by pressing the 2 key on the number pad for
a vertical line, and the 0 key on the number pad for a horizontal line.55
3.4.2 Results
The mean RTs and percentage error rates as a function of task condition (switch/pure)
and distractor congruency in the flanker task (congruent/incongruent) can be seen in
Table 5.
Table 5: Mean RTs and percentage error rates for the visual search and flanker tasks in
switch and pure blocks and distractor congruency in the flanker task
(congruent/incongruent).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task Visual Search Task
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 550 (106) 567 (119) 532 (92) 34 671 (85)
Errors (%) 7 9 5 4 7
Switch
RT (ms) 742 (130) 759 (139) 725 (121) 33 793 (90)
Errors (%) 10.5 12 9 3 7
Switch cost
RT (ms) 192 122
Errors (%) 3.5 0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = Incongruent, C = Congruent.
Visual Search task Visual search task RTs were significantly increased under
switch (vs. pure) conditions, F (1, 7) = 95.2, MSE = 625.6, p < 0.001, a significant task
switch cost, as shown in Table 5. There was no difference in the error rates between the
two task conditions (both were 7%).56
Flanker task. Two 2 (task condition) x 2 (flanker congruency) within-subject
ANOVAs performed on the flanker task RTs and percentage errors revealed longer RTs
for switch than pure trials, F (1, 7) = 49.9, MSE = 5953.1, p < 0.001, showing a
significant task switch RT cost. The increase in RTs to incongruent trials versus
congruent trials seen in Table 5 was marginally significant, F (1, 7) = 5.2, MSE = 1762,
p = 0.057.
In addition, as can be seen in Table 5, distractor congruency effects were the
same in task switch and pure blocks (F < 1 for the interaction). Further inspection of the
data indicated that congruency effects in the pure trials (34 ms) were not significantly
different to those in the pure blocks in Experiment 3 (50 ms), t (20), p = 0.79, but the
congruency effects were significantly different in the switch trials (33 ms in Experiment
5 versus 101 ms in Experiment 3), t (20), p < 0.05. Switching in this experiment, unlike
in Experiment 3, had no effect on distractor congruency effects and as such there was no
interaction.
The error ANOVA replicated the main effect of congruency seen in the RTs, F
(1, 7) = 5.6, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.05, with greater numbers of errors in incongruent
versus congruent trials. There was no main effect of task condition, F (1, 7) = 1.3, MSE
= 0.006, p = 0.28, and no interaction between task condition and congruency for error
rates, F (1, 7) = 2.1, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.20.
In conclusion, Experiment 5 did not support my prediction that distractor
interference will increase under conditions of task switching versus task repetition when
there is no overlap in the responses. Next I test whether the failure to replicate the
increase in distractor interference effects under task switching conditions is a general
effect of separating responses between the two hands, or is specific to the response
competition task.57
3.5 EXPERIMENT 6
In Experiment 6 I investigated whether task switching increases attentional capture by
an irrelevant singleton when the responses to the two tasks are separated, so each hand
responds to only one task.
3.5.1 Method
Participants. Twelve undergraduates from University College London aged
between 18 and 30 and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were paid to
participate in the experiment.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as in
Experiment 4 with the exception that responses to the two tasks were mapped not only
to different fingers, but to different hands, in the same way as in Experiment 5.
3.5.2 Results
The mean RTs and error rates as a function of task condition (switch/pure) and
singleton presence in the attentional capture task (present/absent) are shown in Table 6.58
Table 6: Mean RTs and percentage error rates for the attentional capture task and the
flanker task as a function of task condition (pure/switch) and singleton presence
(present/absent).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional Capture Task Flanker Task
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 784 (128) 808 (139) 761 (118) 47 483 (41)
Errors (%) 5.5 6 5 1 5
Switch
RT (ms) 879 (150) 918 (158) 840 (143) 78 662 (129)
Errors (%) 5.5 6 5 1 4
Task switch cost
RT (ms) 95 179
Errors (%) 0 -1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Singleton present, A = Singleton absent.
Flanker task. As can be seen in Table 6 the flanker task RTs were increased
under switch (vs. pure) conditions, F (1, 11) = 32.2, MSE = 5668.2, p < 0.001, showing
a significant task switching cost, but there was no main effect of task condition in the
errors, F (1, 11) = 0.48, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.50.
Attentional capture task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (singleton presence) within-
subject ANOVA on RTs showed a task switch cost, F (1, 11) = 17.2, MSE = 6288.7, p <
0.01, and a significant capture effect, F (1, 11) = 75.6, MSE = 614.1, p < 0.001 (see
Table 6): RTs were significantly increased for task switch versus pure blocks and
singleton present versus singleton absent trials.
Most importantly, a significant interaction, F (1, 11) = 6.9, MSE = 400.7, p <
0.05, indicated that the effect of singleton presence was greater in switch trials than pure59
trials. This interaction remained significant when the singleton effects were re-
calculated as proportions of singleton absent RTs (M = 6% for pure trials; M = 9% for
switch trials), t (11) = -2.2, SEM = 0.15, p < 0.05, making an account for this effect in
terms of a scaling effect due to increased RTs in switch versus pure blocks unlikely.
The error ANOVA found no significant main effects (singleton presence, F (1,
11) = 2.5, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.15; task condition, F < 1) and no significant interaction
between task condition and singleton presence (F < 1).
Experiment 6 replicated the results of Experiment 4, despite the separation of the
tasks to different hands. The findings of Experiment 6 demonstrate that singleton
capture effects are increased under conditions of task switching, even when the
response-mappings for the two tasks switched between do not overlap between hands.
3.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
Greater interference from distractors in the flanker and attentional capture tasks was
revealed in task switch (vs. pure) blocks when the responses to the two tasks were
mapped to different response keys, replicating the findings from Experiments 1 and 2
when there is no overlap between the response mappings of the two tasks. However,
when the responses to one task were mapped to one hand, and the responses to the other
task were mapped to the other hand, increased distractor interference in switch versus
pure blocks was replicated in the attentional capture task, but not in the flanker task.
An interesting question is why separating responses between the hands
eliminated the effect of task switching on selective attention performance in the flanker
task, but not in the attentional capture task. One possibility is that task switching affects
the two selective attention tasks at different stages of distractor processing. For60
example, the effect of task switching on distractor interference in the flanker task may
occur at the response selection stage, where the opposing response of the distractor in an
incongruent trial competes for control of behaviour. Task switching may act to increase
interference between responses at the response selection stage, so long as there is
overlap between responses, such that the previous tasks responses compete with the
current tasks responses for behavioural control. Greater interference at the response
selection stage would allow the distractor to more effectively compete for behavioral
control under task switch conditions because executive resources would be directed
towards not only rejecting the distractors response, but also the responses to the
previous task. When the responses are separated such that there is a clear distinction
between the responses to the two tasks (e.g. left hand = flanker task, right hand = visual
search task) then this extra interference when task switching is removed.
Note that the simple addition of a greater number of responses in switch versus
pure blocks is unlikely to itself result in the effect of task switching on distractor
interference because, to look ahead, these effects are also revealed when the pure and
switch trials occur within the same block. In this case it is likely that responses to both
tasks are held active across the block, and as such there will be no difference in the
number of responses held active during task switch and task repeat trials, but only in the
recency of making responses to the other tasks, and thus the activation level of the
competing responses.
Whilst the effect of task switching on the ability to selectively attend to a target
in the flanker task may occur at the response competition stage, the effect of task
switching on singleton capture (which was not affected by removing response-mapping
interference) may occur at another stage of higher level functioning, such as target
selection. For example, when executive resources are less available due to task61
switching, the singleton target representation may be less strongly maintained in
working memory, thus allowing the distractor representation to interfere more
effectively with target selection, slowing responses to trials on which an irrelevant
singleton is present compared to trials where it is absent. I return to this point in Chapter
4.
These findings make an important contribution to task switching research,
supporting Rubin and Meiran’s (2005) finding of significant task switch costs with both
stimuli affording, and responses related to, only one task. As discussed previously,
earlier research only established a task switching cost with tasks that had either
overlapping stimuli (Meiran, 2000) or response-mappings (Meiran, 2000; Rogers and
Monsell, 1995, Experiment 4; Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001; Sumner &
Ahmed, 2006), and typically both (e.g. Rogers and Monsell, 1995).62
CHAPTER 4
The Effect of Task Switching on Distractor
Interference when Pure and Switch Trials are in
the Same Block63
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of Chapter 4 is to further break down the executive control demands of task
switching, with a view to more specifically attributing the greater distractor interference
effects in switch trials to a particular element of executive control. To this end, the
contribution of the mixing cost to my task switching costs in Chapters 2 and 3 was
removed, and the effects of the executive demands of task switching versus task mixing
on distractor interference were assessed and compared.
The task switching cost revealed in previous chapters can be further divided into
a specific task switching cost and a task mixing cost (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000;
Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; for review see Rubin and Meiran, 2005). The specific
task switching cost measures the difference in the time taken to respond to pure and
switch trials when both trial types are displayed within the same block. The task mixing
cost measures the difference in reaction times to repeated-task trials in a between-block
design, where repeated-task trials are presented in a pure block, and repeated-task trials
in a within-block design, where repeated-task trials and switch trials are presented in the
same block. Thus, the task mixing cost measures the effect of mixing task A within a
block with task B compared to performing task A alone in a ‘pure’ block.
Support for the distinction between the task switching cost and task mixing cost
comes from a behavioural double dissociation regarding the effects of age and ADHD
on task switch versus task mix costs: Old age had a strong effect on the mixing cost, but
a relatively weak effect on the task switching cost (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000),
whereas children with ADHD showed increased task switching costs, but normal
mixing costs (Cepeda, Cepeda, & Kramer, 2000).64
Originally, the mixing cost was thought to reflect processes such as working
memory demands (storage of two versus one task-set), division of attention between
perceptual dimensions, degree of arousal and effort, response criterion, and so on
(Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). However, the mixing cost may be an
important measure of executive demand because it compares a condition where task
performance can almost be performed automatically (pure trials in pure blocks), with a
condition in which task performance occurs in a control demanding environment
(nonswitch trials in AAABBB blocks; Rubin & Meiran, 2005).
An interesting question, then, is whether the mixing cost and switching cost
measure different aspects of executive control, and, if so, how much each contributes to
the overall task switch cost. Indeed, recent accounts suggest that the specific task
switching cost comparing switch and nonswitch trials within a block loads on transient
executive control processes operating on a trial by trial basis (Braver, Reynolds, &
Donaldson, 2003; Logan & Bundeson, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), for example
triggered by interference between task-sets. Mixing tasks within a block, on the other
hand, may load more sustained or global control processes which operate across blocks
(Braver et al., 2003; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000), such as
the maintenance or sustained activation of two task-sets in a mixed block compared to
one in a pure block.
Whilst this simple distinction is tempting, some doubt has been cast by work
carried out by Rubin and Meiran (2005). They showed large mixing costs when stimuli
afforded both tasks, but small and non-significant mixing costs when the stimuli
afforded only one task (see also Mayr, 2001), suggesting that the mixing cost reflects
the transient control processes triggered by interference between task-sets, rather than
sustained control processes. In contrast, switching costs were large and significant for65
both stimulus types, suggesting that the switching cost was not contributed to by these
transient control processes. Note, however, that many previous studies have found that
when the stimulus is not associated with both task-sets, task switch costs are often
eliminated or, at the very least, reduced to an almost negligible amount (Allport et al.,
1994, Experiment 4; Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976) suggesting that some
aspect of overall task switch costs does rely heavily on transient control processes
triggered by interference between tasks-sets. Rubin and Meiran (2005) also found no
effect of working memory load on the task mixing cost nor on the specific task
switching cost, suggesting the sustained control processes involved in maintaining task-
goals and/S-R mappings in working memory does not contribute to these costs.
However, this study does not suggest that other sustained control processes are not
involved in the control of task switching or task mixing costs.
The research reviewed above supports a different role of executive control in
task switching versus task mixing costs. To this end, the current experiments aim to
investigate whether it is the executive demand required by mixing tasks or switching to
a new task, or both, which affects distractor interference. Investigating the effect of task
switching on distractor interference without the mixing cost will either: i) have no effect
on task switch costs and selective attention performance because mixing cost did not
load executive control in these experiments; ii) reduce overall (but not specific) task
switch costs by removing the contribution of task mixing, but have no effect on the
difference in selective attention performance between pure and switch trials because it is
the executive demand of switching tasks which is responsible for the increased
distractor interference effects in task switch blocks; iii) reduce overall task switch costs,
as above, and facilitate selective attention performance by removing the additional
executive demand of mixing tasks, suggesting the executive demand of mixing tasks66
was responsible for some of the greater distractor interference effects in task switch
blocks; iv) reduce the overall task switch cost and eliminate the difference in selective
attention performance between pure and switch trials, suggesting the executive demand
of mixing tasks is responsible for the effect of task switch blocks on distractor
interference effects.
In my prior experiments the contributions of the executive demand of switching
versus mixing tasks to the detrimental effect of task switch blocks on selective attention
performance could not be assessed. In the current chapter I investigate how the
executive demands of task mixing versus task switching affect selective attention
performance. By presenting both pure and switch trials within the same block I
investigate the effects of specific task switching (without the presence of the task
mixing cost) on distractor interference effects. Task mixing does not contribute to the
task switch cost under these conditions because pure and switch trials are no longer
compared between one-task and two-task blocks. Thus, by comparing task switch costs
and distractor interference effects between experiments I can assess the relative
contributions of task switching and task mixing to task switch costs and selective
attention performance. Repeat-task trials occurring within the same block as switch
trials will be referred to as nonswitch trials, and repeat-task trials occurring in pure
blocks in previous experiments will be referred to as pure trials.
4.2 EXPERIMENT 7
Experiment 7 aims to more specifically attribute the effect on distractor processing to
task switching per se, rather than to additional executive demand which might result
from mixing tasks, or the contribution from other between block differences, such as67
effort and arousal. Thus, in Experiment 7 only switch blocks with the trial order
AAABBB were presented. In this way a comparison could be made between the
distractor interference effects in switch trials (the first trial A following 3 trial Bs, and
vice versa) and non-switch trials (the second trial in each 3-trial sequence) within the
same block.
I predict that in an AAABBB design there will be significant switch costs, as
well as greater distractor interference effects in switch (vs. nonswitch) trials. Mixing
costs will be assessed by comparing nonswitch trials in the AAABBB design with pure
trials in the pure blocks in previous chapters.
4.2.1 Method
Participants. Ten subjects (18-35) from University College London with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 3 and the
procedure was similar to that in Experiment 3, with the exception that trials were
presented in an AAABBB order in every block. In each of 12 AAABBB blocks 3 of one
task and then 3 of the other task were randomly selected without replacement, and this
sequence repeated until 80 trials had been performed. The blocks alternated between
blocks starting with task A and blocks starting with task B. The task beginning the first
block was task A for half of the participants and task B for the other half.
4.2.2 Results
The mean RTs and percentage error rates as a function of the experimental conditions
can be seen in Table 7.68
Table 7: Mean RTs and percentage errors for the flanker task and the visual search task
as a function of task condition (pure/switch) and congruency (congruent/incongruent)
when trials were presented in AAABBB blocks.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task Visual Search Task
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Nonswitch
RT (ms) 668 (68) 691 (74) 647 (73) 44 915 (109)
Errors (%) 3 5 2 3 3
Switch
RT (ms) 969 (164) 1025 (165) 913 (166) 112 1143 (136)
Errors (%) 8.5 8 9 -1 8
Switch cost
RT (ms) 301 228
Errors (%) 5.5 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = incongruent, C = Congruent.
Visual search task. As shown in Table 7, RTs were longer in switch versus pure
blocks, F (1, 9) = 41.1, MSE = 6339.1, p < 0.001, revealing a significant task switching
RT cost in the AAABBB design. There was also a non-significant trend in the error
rates, F (1, 9) = 3.6, MSE = 0.003, p = 0.09, with more errors in the switch than
nonswitch trials.
Nonswitch trial RTs in Experiment 7 (915 ms) were not significantly longer than
pure block trials in Experiment 3 (812 ms), t (27) = -1.6, p = 0.12, although there was a
numerical trend in the direction predicted by a task mixing cost.
Flanker task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (congruency) within-subject ANOVA
revealed significantly greater RTs in switch versus pure blocks, F (1, 9) = 57.7, MSE =69
15574.7, p < 0.001, and in the incongruent versus congruent trials, F (1, 9) = 41.4, MSE
= 1484.9, p < 0.001, as before.
Most importantly for my hypothesis there was a significant interaction between
task condition and distractor congruency, F (1, 9) = 23.6, MSE = 487.0, p < 0.001:
distractor effects were more than doubled in the switch versus pure trials in the
AAABBB block design (see Table 7). This interaction remained significant when the
data were analysed as proportions for the switch and pure trials, t (9) = 2.3, SEM =
0.023, p < 0.05, suggesting that the increased distractor interference in switch trials was
not due to the prolonged RTs in switch versus pure trials.
In the error rates there was a marginally significant effect of task condition, F (1,
9) = 5.0, MSE = 0.005, p = 0.053, with greater errors in switch versus nonswitch trials,
as can be seen in Table 7. There was no effect of congruency nor an interaction between
task condition and congruency in the errors (F < 1 for congruency main effect: F (1, 9)
= 2.9, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.12, for the interaction between task condition and distractor
congruency).
Nonswitch RTs in Experiment 7 (668 ms) were not significantly different from
the pure trial RTs in Experiment 3 (658 ms), t (27) = -0.2, p = 0.84, suggesting that
there was no effect of mixing tasks on the flanker task RTs. T-tests comparing
Experiments 3 and 7 showed no significant difference between task switch costs (254
ms and 301 ms, respectively), t (27) = -1, p = 0.34, and no significant difference
between distractor interference effects in the pure versus nonswitch trials (64 ms and 44
ms, respectively), t (27) = 0.9, p = 0.36. These findings further suggest that any
additional executive demand of mixing tasks did not affect task switch costs and
distractor interference effects in the flanker task in Experiment 3.70
Experiment 7 thus replicated the finding of greater distractor interference in
switch versus pure trials in Experiment 3 but with both trial types occurring within the
same block. Experiment 7 suggests that the increase in distractor interference effects
under task switching conditions is not due to the executive demand involved in mixing
tasks, but rather the executive demand involved in switching between tasks.
4.3 EXPERIMENT 8
In Experiment 8 I examined whether increased attentional capture by an irrelevant
singleton when task switching can also be found in switch versus pure trials when both
are presented within the same block.
4.3.1 Method
Participants. Twelve subjects (18-35, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision)
from University College London were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as those used
in Experiment 4, with the exception that trials were presented in an AAABBB order in
every block. The AAABBB block design was the same as in Experiment 7 except that
there were 6 blocks in which the AAABBB sequence repeated until 288 trials had been
performed.
4.3.2 Results
Mean RTs and percentage error rates as a function of task condition (nonswitch/switch)
and singleton presence in the attentional capture task (absent/present) can be seen in
Table 8.71
Table 8: Mean RTs and percentage error rates for the attentional capture task and the
flanker task as a function of task condition (nonswitch/switch) and singleton presence
(sin absent/sin present) when trials were presented in AAABBB blocks.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional Capture Task Flanker Task
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Nonswitch
RT (ms) 923 (156) 956 (155) 889 (164) 67 556 (70)
Errors (%) 4 4 4 0 2
Switch
RT (ms) 1080 (184) 1101 (180) 1058 (195) 43 848 (148)
Errors (%) 4 4 4 0 4
Switch cost
RT (ms) 157 292
Errors (%) 0 2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Singleton present, A = Singleton absent.
Flanker task. As can be seen in Table 8, RTs were longer in switch than in
nonswitch trials in the flanker task, F (1, 11) = 99.8, MSE = 5126.5, p < 0.001, showing
a significant task switching cost. The percentage errors in the flanker task were
increased in the switch versus nonswitch trials, but this was not significant, F (1, 11) =
3.5, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.09.
There was a significant effect of mixing tasks in the AAABBB design on the
flanker task RTs, t (18) = -3, p < 0.01, with nonswitch trial RTs (922 ms) significantly
increased compared to pure trial RTs in Experiment 4 (716 ms).
Attentional Capture task. Two 2 (task condition: switch/nonswitch) x 2
(singleton presence: present/absent) within-subjects ANOVAs were performed on the
RT data and percentage error rates. The RT ANOVA revealed significant effects of task72
condition, F (1, 11) = 57.9, MSE = 5166.3, p < 0.001, with longer RTs in switch versus
nonswitch trials, and also singleton presence, F = 8.5, MSE = 36465.2, p < 0.05, with
longer RTs in the singleton present versus absent trials, thus establishing both a task
switching cost and attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton.
However, there was no interaction between task condition and singleton
presence, F (1, 11) = 2.1, MSE = 768.0, p = 0.17.
Error rates were the same under all conditions (see Table 8).
A possible explanation for the lack of interaction here is that the increase in
attentional capture effects in task switch versus pure task blocks resulted from the
executive demand of mixing tasks, rather than that of switching tasks. Indeed, there
were significantly longer RTs in the nonswitch trials in Experiment 8 (922 ms) versus
pure trials in Experiment 4 (716 ms), t (18) = 3.3, SED = 62.5, p < 0.01, establishing
that there was a significant effect of mixing tasks on attentional capture task RTs.
However, although there was a strong numerical trend, there was no significant
interaction between mixing task condition and singleton presence, F (1, 18) = 1.2, MSE
= 1580, p = 0.3, with singleton effects not significantly greater in nonswitch (67 ms)
compared to pure trials (39 ms).
The RT cost of switching to the attentional capture task in the AAABBB within-
blocks design in Experiment 8 (157 ms) was reduced compared to the between-blocks
design in Experiment 4 (241 ms), t (18) = -1.9, SED = 43.4, p = 0.07, showing that the
mixing cost explains some of the task switch cost revealed between pure and switch
blocks in Experiment 4. The reduction in task switching cost in the within- versus
between-block design is mostly attributable to the mixing cost, rather than the relatively
smaller non-significant increase in the RTs to switch trials in Experiment 8 (1080 ms)
versus Experiment 4 (957 ms) design, t (18) = 1.4, SED = 86.0, p = 0.17.73
In an attempt to rule out the mixing cost as an account of the increased
attentional capture effects revealed in previous experiments, I now aim to facilitate
performance in nonswitch trials. This manipulation, if successful, may reveal an
increase in singleton capture effects under task switching versus nonswitching
conditions. In Experiment 9 I attempt to facilitate performance in the attentional capture
nonswitch trials in an AAABBB design.
4.4 EXPERIMENT 9
In Experiment 9 the amount of practice on the attentional capture task was increased in
order to facilitate performance of the attentional capture nonswitch trials. In Experiment
9 the number of AAABBB blocks was increased from 6 to 12.
4.4.1 Method
Participants. Eight undergraduates (18-35) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision from University College London were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as those used
in Experiment 8, with the exception that the number of AAABBB blocks was increased
from 6 to 12.
4.4.2 Results
The mean RTs and percentage error rates as a function of task condition
(nonswitch/switch) and singleton presence in the attentional capture task
(absent/present) are shown in Table 9.74
Table 9: Mean RTs and percentage error rates for the attentional capture task and the
flanker task as a function of task condition (nonswitch/switch) and singleton presence
(sin absent/sin present) with 12 AAABBB blocks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional Capture Task Flanker Task
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Nonswitch
RT (ms) 861 (110) 889 (114) 832 (109) 57 539 (84)
Errors (%) 7 6 7 -1 5
Switch
RT (ms) 1053 (171) 1082 (166) 1023 (180) 59 913 (166)
Errors (%) 7 7 6 1 9
Switch cost
RT (ms) 192 374
Errors (%) 0 4
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Singleton present, A = Singleton absent.
Flanker task. Table 9 shows the significant effect of task condition in both the
flanker task RTs, F (1, 7) = 69.3, MSE = 8084.1, p < 0.001, with longer RTs in switch
than nonswitch trials; and percentage error rates, F (1, 7) = 13.1, MSE = 0.001, p <
0.01, with more errors committed in switch than nonswitch trials.
There was a nonsignificant trend towards a mixing cost in the flanker task RTs, t
(14) = -1.9, p = 0.085, with longer RTs in the nonswitch (548 ms) versus pure (462 ms)
trials in Experiment 4.
Attentional Capture task. Two 2 (task condition) x 2 (singleton presence) within-
subject ANOVAs performed on the RT data and percentage error rates revealed
increased RTs in switch versus nonswitch trials, F (1, 7) = 26.1, MSE = 11361.1, p <
0.001, and in singleton present versus singleton absent trials, F (1, 7) = 33.1, MSE =75
819.2, p < 0.001, replicating the significant task switch costs and singleton capture
effects revealed in Experiment 8.
However, the singleton capture effect again did not differ in the switch versus
nonswitch trials (F < 1, see Table 9) in the AAABBB design, even with increased
practice of the attentional capture task.
The error ANOVA replicated neither of the main effects (F < 1 for both the task
condition and singleton presence main effects) and there was no interaction between
task condition and singleton presence, F (1, 7) = 1.9, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.21.
As predicted, increasing practice of the tasks reduced RTs in the nonswitch
attentional capture trials (by 61 ms from Experiment 8), but this reduction was not
significant, t (18) = -0.96, p = 0.36. In other words task switch costs to the attentional
capture task were not significantly increased in Experiment 9 compared to Experiment
8, t (18) = 0.87, p = 0.4, and RTs to the nonswitch trials in Experiment 9 were still
significantly greater than the RTs to the pure trials in Experiment 4, t (14) = 2.8, p <
0.05: there was still a significant mixing cost. However, note that the non-significant
increase in switch cost from Experiment 8 to 9 (35 ms) was enough for the RT cost of
task switching in Experiment 9 (192 ms) to no longer be significantly different from
that in Experiment 4 (between-blocks; 241 ms), t (14) = -0.85, p = 0.4.
Once again there was a nonsignificant numerical trend towards greater
attentional capture in the task mix (nonswitch trials, 57ms) than no task mix (pure trials
in Experiment 4, 39 ms) conditions. This trend did not reach significance, F (1, 14) =
1.4, MSE = 460, p = 0.26.
In summary, Experiment 9 still did not find any effect of task switching on
attentional capture, despite increasing the amount of practice on the attentional capture
task and somewhat increasing the task switching cost.76
4.5 EXPERIMENT 10
Experiment 10 aimed to facilitate repetition trial performance in the attentional capture
task in the AAABBB design in order to increase the cost of a switch between tasks. In
Experiment 10 the number of repetitions of the attentional capture task prior to
nonswitch trials in a within-block design was increased. In this way the attentional
capture nonswitch trials were made more similar to the attentional capture pure trials in
Experiment 4.
In Experiment 10 the two tasks were presented in 9A3B
(…AAAAAAAAABBB…) blocks, with task A being the attentional capture task.
4.5.1 Method
Participants. Ten undergraduates (18-35) from University College London with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as Experiment
8, with the exception that trials were presented in the order …AAAAAAAAABBB…
(9A3B), where A is the attentional capture task. Trials included as nonswitch trials for
the attentional capture task were in positions 5 – 8 in each run of 9 trials. In this way
nonswitch trials occurred after 4 previous repetitions of the attentional capture task.
4.5.2 Results
The mean RTs and percentage error rates as a function of task condition
(nonswitch/switch) and singleton presence in the attentional capture task
(absent/present) can be seen in Table 10.77
Table 10: Mean RTs and percentage error rates for the attentional capture task and the
flanker task as a function of task condition (nonswitch/switch) and singleton presence
(sin absent/sin present) when trials were presented in AAABBB blocks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional Capture Task Flanker Task
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Nonswitch
RT (ms) 889 (110) 928 (117) 849 (104) 79 539 (73)
Errors (%) 6.5 6 7 -1 4
Switch
RT (ms) 1306 (308) 1355 (325) 1256 (299) 99 1040 (242)
Errors (%) 6 7 5 2 8
Switch cost
RT (ms) 417 501
Errors (%) -0.5 4
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Singleton present, A = Singleton absent.
Flanker task. As can be seen in Table 10, there were longer RTs in the switch
than nonswitch trials in the flanker task, F (1, 9) = 72.4, MSE = 17283.2, p < 0.001, and
more errors made in switch versus nonswitch trials, F (1, 9) = 52.2, MSE = 0.00, p <
0.001.
There was a significant effect of mixing tasks on nonswitch RTs in the flanker
task, t (16) = - 2.1, p = 0.05, with longer RTs in nonswitch (539 ms) than pure trials in
Experiment 4 (462 ms).
Attentional Capture task. Two 2 (task condition) x 2 (singleton presence) within-
subject ANOVAs found significantly greater RTs in switch versus nonswitch trials, F
(1, 9) = 29.7, MSE = 58579.3, p < 0.001, and significantly greater RTs in the singleton
present versus singleton absent trials, F (1, 9) = 45.6, MSE = 1739.2, p < 0.001, again78
replicating significant task switch costs and singleton capture effects in a within-block
design.
However, although there was a numerical trend for greater attentional capture in
task switch versus nonswitch trials (see Table 10) this did not reach significance (F < 1).
The error ANOVA did not replicate the main effects of task condition (F < 1),
nor singleton presence, F (1, 9) = 3.51, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.09. However, there was a
significant interaction between singleton presence and task switch condition, F (1, 9) =
5.3, MSE = 0.00, p < 0.05: the error singleton effect (singleton present errors – absent
errors) was larger in the switch than nonswitch trials. Thus, the effects in the errors
provide some support for the current hypothesis.
Increasing the number of attentional capture trials occurring prior to the
nonswitch attentional capture trials in Experiment 10 did not significantly reduce
nonswitch trial RTs (889 ms versus 923 ms in Experiment 8), t (20) = -0.58, p = 0.58.
Note that, as in Experiment 9, RTs to the nonswitch trials were still significantly
different to those in Experiment 4 (716 ms), t (16) = 3.5, p < 0.05: there was still a
significant cost associated with mixing tasks.
Critically, in Experiment 10 there was a significant interaction between mixing
cost and singleton presence, F (1, 16) = 5.9, MSE = 611, p < 0.05, with significantly
greater singleton capture effects revealed in the nonswitch trials (79 ms) compared to
pure trials in Experiment 4 (39 ms). This result strongly supports the view that the
executive demand of mixing tasks is responsible for increased attentional capture in
switch blocks versus pure blocks in previous experiments, rather than the executive
demand directly associated with a switch between tasks.
As predicted, task switch costs were significantly increased in Experiment 10 in
comparison to Experiment 8, t (20) = 3.5, p < 0.01. Interestingly, the task switch cost in79
Experiment 10 (417 ms) was also significantly greater than in the between-block task
switch cost in Experiment 4 (241 ms), t (16) = 1.9, p < 0.05. Despite this successful
increase in task switch costs, singleton capture effects on RTs were still not
significantly increased in switch versus pure trials, and the increase in the capture effect
with switching on errors was fairly small, when these trials were presented in a within-
block design. This supports the view that it is the need to mix two tasks within the same
block that effects attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton, and not the specific need
to switch between tasks.
Further support that the specific task switch cost does not affect singleton
capture effects comes from the increase in task switch costs in Experiment 10, versus
Experiments 8 and 4, which was not accompanied by a concurrent increase in singleton
capture effects in Experiment 10 versus Experiment 8, t (20) = 1.4, p = 0.16, nor
Experiment 4, t (16) = 1.6, p = 0.14. The presence of a mixing cost in previous
experiments which did reveal increased attentional capture in switching versus pure
blocks again strongly suggests that it is the executive demand associated with mixing
tasks which affects selective attention performance on the attentional capture task.
Although nonswitch trial RTs were not reduced to a significant degree it was the
significant increase in the switch trial RTs in Experiment 10 (1305 ms) compared to
Experiment 8 (1080 ms), t (20) = 2.12, p < 0.05, and the between-block design in
Experiment 4 (957 ms), t (16) = 2.77, p < 0.05, which was largely responsible for the
increased task switch cost. Thus, in Experiment 10 the increase in the number of trials
prior to a nonswitch trial did not increase task switching costs by facilitating nonswitch
trial performance. Rather, increasing the frequency of the attentional capture task
(compared to the other task) seems to increase the RT cost of a switch to the attentional
capture task. Note that this frequency effect on specific task switch costs was not due to80
the attentional capture task becoming the better learned task due to increased practice
(see Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Monsell, 2003; Yeung & Monsell, 2003), because
switch performance was also significantly decreased in the flanker task in Experiment
10 versus Experiment 8, t (20) = 2.3, p < 0.05, and versus Experiment 4, t (16) = 3.4, p
< 0.01.
It is possible that the increased task switch cost in Experiment 10, due to the
increase in switch RTs, resulted from the difficulty in monitoring how many repetitions
of the attentional capture task were left before a switch to the flanker task was required.
Under these conditions the strategy of not preparing for task switches in advance may
have been easier than monitoring when a task switch was due. Although there were only
3 trials of the flanker task it would be economical to apply the same strategy to both
tasks throughout the blocks, rather than attempt to switch strategy when switching tasks.
Preparation for a switch allows some of the work by executive resources to be carried
out prior to the task switch and as such reduces switch costs. By not preparing for a
switch the amount of work to be done by executive resources on switch trials (i.e. in
preparing the system for the new task) is increased.
Experiment 10 suggests that the smaller difference between switch trials and
nonswitch trials in Experiment 8 versus switch and pure trials in Experiment 4, reflected
in significantly smaller task switch costs in Experiment 8, were not responsible for the
elimination of the interaction between task condition and singleton presence: Although
task switch costs in Experiments 9 and 10 were increased and were thus not smaller
(indeed in Experiment 10 were significantly larger) than in Experiment 4, the
interaction between task condition and singleton capture still did not approach
significance in a within-block design.81
Experiment 10 made an alternative account for the greater attentional capture in
the switch versus pure blocks as due to habituation to the singleton in the pure blocks in
Experiment 4 unlikely. In the between-block design in Experiment 4, repeated
performance of the attentional capture task in the pure blocks may have resulted in
habituation to the irrelevant singleton, reducing the attentional capture observed in the
pure blocks compared to the switch blocks. Allowing sustained, repetitive performance
of the attentional capture task in the within-block design should allow habituation to the
singleton in nonswitch trials and thus increase the difference in singleton effects
between nonswitch and switch trials. Experiment 10 did not significantly increase the
difference in singleton capture effects between switch and nonswitch trials, thus
suggesting habituation to the singleton distractor was not responsible for the greater
singleton capture in switch than pure trials in Experiment 4.
In summary, in Experiment 10, switching to the first of a run of 9 attentional
capture task trials increased the RT cost of switching compared to Experiments 8, 9 and
4. However, Experiment 10 did not find significantly greater singleton capture effects in
switch versus pure trials in a within-block design, despite this increase in task switch
costs. Interestingly, Experiment 10 revealed a significant effect of mixing tasks on the
singleton capture effect, suggesting that the need to mix tasks within a block loads
executive resources required to ensure an irrelevant singleton does not capture attention.
These finding strongly support the view that the increase in attentional capture effects
when comparing switch and pure blocks is due to the executive demand of mixing tasks,
rather than the executive demand specifically associated with switching from
performance of one task to performance of another.82
4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
Task switching reduced selective attention performance in the flanker task when both
the trials involving a switch between tasks, and those requiring the previous task to be
repeated, were presented within the same block. However, task switching under these
conditions had no effect on attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton. Despite
manipulations which successfully increased the cost of the specific task switches on
general task performance, the ability to avoid distraction from an irrelevant singleton
distractor remained the same on switch and nonswitch trials. Revealingly, the
requirement to mix tasks within a block did increase capture by an irrelevant singleton,
suggesting that it is the executive demand associated with mixing tasks which resulted
in the effect of task switching on capture effects in previous experiments, rather than
that of the specific need to switch between two tasks. Whilst the effect of task switching
on flanker task performance is due to the executive demand incurred by a specific
switch from one task to another, the effect of task switching on attentional capture is
due to the extra executive demand required when mixing tasks.
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, many authors have argued for a
differentiation between slow, sustained executive processes involved in mixing tasks
and more transient executive processes involved in switching the cognitive system from
one tasks performance to another (Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Koch, Prinz,
& Allport, 2005; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Logan & Bundeson, 2003; Mayr &
Kliegl, 2003; although see also Rubin & Meiran, 2005). Selective attention performance
in the attentional capture task is heavily reliant on the ability to actively maintain
representations of the target and distractor. The ability of sustained executive processes
to maintain the abstract identity of the distractor (i.e. ignore any singleton which is not83
the target, or ignore any colour singleton) and suppress it and/or monitor for the
presence of the distractor singleton, should be directly predictive of the amount of
singleton capture by an irrelevant singleton. In this way, attentional capture effects
might be affected only by limitation in the availability of sustained executive processes
which may be loaded by mixing tasks. This could explain why selective attention
performance in the attentional capture task was unaffected by task switching once the
requirement to mix tasks was present in both pure and switch trials. In comparison, the
flanker effect relies on a more transient control process of response competition
resolution which must be completed anew on every trial. Thus, whilst flanker task
performance relies on maintenance of the task-set also, the interference from the
irrelevant distractor specifically depends on the availability of transient response-
conflict resolution control processes at the response-selection stage, such as those
required for a switch between two tasks.
It is important to note that in the previous chapter I argued that flanker effects
occur at the response competition stage and attentional capture effects occur at a later
stage of processing. I made this argument on the basis that the effect of task switching
on flanker effects, but not on attentional capture effects, was eliminated when responses
to the two tasks were separated between the hands. These double dissociations in the
effects of response mappings and the effects of switching versus mixing blocks on
distraction in the flanker versus attentional capture tasks strongly support a distinction
in the executive resource required for performance of the two selective attention tasks.
In light of the suggestion that attentional capture is mediated by executive
resources involved in controlling mixing, rather than switching, tasks, the failure of
manipulations aimed at facilitating nonswitch trial performance in order to increase task
switching costs, and thus reveal an effect of task switching on attentional capture, can84
be explained: the nonswitch RTs reflected the cost of mixing tasks, and as such were
not reduced by manipulations which were not designed to reduce the cost of mixing
tasks.
Another possible explanation of the mixing cost, other than the executive
demand of mixing tasks, might be that it is due to the carryover of specific interference
effects in the switch trials to the nonswitch trials. Whilst it has been revealed previously
that, for example, stimulus-response mappings of the previous task carryover across a
number of trials (for review see Allport & Wylie, 2000; Goshke, 2000; Monsell, 2003)
this is only the case when the stimuli cue the response-mappings for both tasks. In the
current experiments the stimulus is different in each task and does not cue the response-
mappings of the previously performed task, and there is no overlap between response-
mappings, suggesting carryover effects are not responsible for the mixing costs
revealed.
Note that the effect of first trial performance on task switch costs is not assessed
here, but this is another contributor to task switch costs which is confounded between
pure and switch trials in the current experiments. Future work could further separate the
executive demand of task switching and assess more directly which demands in switch
blocks are responsible for the detrimental affect on selective attention performance.
The current findings support the distinction in the literature between sustained
executive control of mixing tasks, and transient executive control of switching tasks. As
discussed above, the results suggest that the mixing cost results from sustained
executive demand which also affects the more sustained executive requirements of the
attentional capture task; and that the specific task switching cost results from the more
transient executive demand involved in both switching between tasks and performing
the flanker task.85
In summary, Chapter 4 revealed both significant task switching and task mixing
costs as well as distractor interference effects in both the flanker task and attentional
capture task. Whilst task switching affected interference from distractors in the flanker
task, it was rather the executive demand of task mixing which was responsible for the
previously found effect of task switching on attentional capture by an irrelevant
singleton.86
CHAPTER 5
Task-Unrelated Thoughts During Task
Switching87
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Another form of distraction on the performance of a primary task which may be affected
by a switch between tasks is task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs), or mind wandering. TUTs
are thoughts occurring during the performance of a task which are unassociated with
carrying out the task, and can be considered as intrusions, or distractions, from
internally generated processes whilst a task is being executed. Recent studies provide
evidence that TUTs require executive control resources, and as such I hypothesise that
TUT should also be affected by a switch between tasks.
Much evidence in the TUT literature supports a role of executive control in mind
wandering. Studies have repeatedly revealed that the extent to which primary tasks
interfere with TUTs depends upon the level of executive demand made by the task:
more executive demand in the primary task results in less TUTs and vice versa
(Antrobus, 1968; Filler & Giambra, 1973; Teasdale et al., 1993; 1995). Decreasing the
executive demands of pursuit rotor and memory tasks by increasing practice
(independent of fatigue) has also been associated with increased TUT frequency
(Teasdale et al., 1995). Smallwood, Obonsawin, and Reid (2003) hypothesised that
block duration mediated changes in TUTs would be reduced for fluency tasks, which
rely heavily on controlled processing and are thus not readily automated, compared to
other less control-demanding (verbal encoding and vigilance) tasks. Whereas the
executive demand of the verbal encoding and vigilance tasks reduced with block length
as they became more automated, the fluency task required the same executive input
throughout the block. TUTs in the tasks more given to automation increased with block
length, but there was no effect of block length on TUTs in the fluency task. Thus, TUTs
reflected the availability of executive resources, increasing as the executive demands of88
the tasks more prone to automation decreased, and staying the same for the fluency task,
where the executive demand of the task did not reduce with practice.
Random generation of numbers, argued by Baddeley (1996) to involve executive
control in order to suppress the use of an automatic response pattern (such as odd
numbers), was also less random when TUTs were concurrently reduced, suggesting
these two tasks share a requirement for executive control (Teasdale et al., 1995).
Studies using the sustained attention to response task (SART), a go/no go task,
where participants respond to the numbers 0-9 with a key press but suppress responding
to one number, usually the number 3, provides further evidence that executive control is
involved in TUTs. The SART task gives a measure of failures in controlled processing:
When the SART becomes more automated, and is less under the direct control of
executive resources, there will be more errors in suppressing the response to the no go
target, especially when the target is more infrequent. Evidence that errors on the SART
reflect a drift of attention from the primary task comes from studies showing that SART
errors both predict (Robertson et al., 1997), and are predicted by (Manly et al., 1999)
questionnaire measures of absentmindedness. Faster SART RTs are associated with
experimental blocks in which TUTs occur compared to those where attention remains
directed towards the primary task (Smallwood et al., 2004), supporting the view that
TUTs result in more automated task performance due to less executive control of the
primary task. Increased TUTs (measured retrospectively) are also associated with
increased errors during blocks where executive control is disengaged from the task (i.e.
blocks where RTs were faster) suggesting the pre-potent response was stronger and
therefore more automated.
Further support for the reliance of TUTs on executive control comes from five
experiments showing a large and consistent decrease in TUTs as age increases89
(Giambra, 1989). Increasing age is associated with an overall decline in executive
functioning (e.g. Salthouse et al., 1998) and thus this finding supports the suggestion
that reduced executive control results in reduced experience of TUTs.
Imaging studies also support a role for frontal-executive control in TUTs,
indicating that TUTs share cognitive and neural mechanisms with task-related thought
processes (Christoff, Ream, and Gabrieli, 2004). Comparing periods of rest (where
TUTs are free to occur) with periods where a simple cognitive task is engaged in,
Christoff et al. (2004) identified activity associated with rest in higher cortical regions
such as rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, temporopolar cortex, parahippocampus, parietal
and visual cortical areas. Interestingly, rest has frequently been used as a baseline in the
past for comparing activation whilst performing a cognitive task. Studies have shown
that certain areas do not show a difference in activation during higher cognitive tasks
when rest is used as a baseline, such as complex memory retrieval, problem solving, and
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, all tasks which consistently activate the rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (e.g. Christoff et al., 2001; Christoff, & Gabrieli, 2000; Goldberg et
al., 1998). However, critically, activation differences are seen in the same tasks when
compared to a baseline using an unrelated secondary task (e.g. Buckner et al., 1996;
Ragland et al., 1998). These findings suggest that activations in this prefrontal area are
associated with brain activity present during both higher level cognitive tasks and rest,
supporting a role of executive control in ‘rest’ conditions, where TUTs are free to occur.
In addition, some studies have shown striking similarities between the patterns
of activation present when at rest and those associated with particular higher cognitive
functions. For example, activation associated with both an episodic memory task and a
rest condition was found in higher cortical regions, including prefrontal and parietal
association cortices (Andreasen et al., 2004). Post-experiment interviews revealed that90
rest was an active process involving freely wandering past recollection, future plans,
and other personal thoughts and experiences. Binder et al. (1999) found similar areas
associated with both a semantic retrieval task and rest. They argue that rest is associated
with semantic knowledge retrieval, representation in awareness, and manipulation of
represented knowledge. These studies strongly suggest that rest (time in which
participants are free to experience TUTs) is associated with regions (such as the
prefrontal cortex) and activities (such as manipulation of knowledge) thought to be
heavily involved in executive control.
More specifically, prefrontal executive areas appear to be heavily involved in
TUTs when there is awareness of the contents of the mind wandering episode, but not
when there is no awareness of the content of the mind wandering episode (Smith et al.,
2006). TUTs with no thought content awareness were associated with activations in
areas related to long-term memory storage (such as hippocampus). It should be noted
that executive control areas are not always involved unless TUT is associated with
thought content awareness. This suggests that frontal-executive resources may not be
involved in the initiation of TUTs, but rather in the control and coordination of
information in awareness during a mind wandering episode (e.g. Smallwood &
Schooner, 2006).
In summary, a combination of behavioural and neuroscientific evidence supports
the view that content-aware TUTs rely on frontal-executive resources. I therefore
hypothesise that a reduction in the availability of these resources, via the requirement to
switch between tasks, should result in reduced frequency of report of TUTs. Note that
this predicted reduction in interference from an internal source of distraction (TUTs) is
contrary to the revealed increase in interference from an external source of distraction
(visual distractors) during task switching versus task repetition. Investigating the effect91
of executive load on TUTs offers a comparison between the role of executive control in
inhibiting external distractors versus supporting internal distraction, offering insight into
the dissociation between distraction from internal and external sources.
I tested this hypothesis by measuring TUTs via probe questions, occurring at the
end of each short block of experimental trials, asking whether participants had any task-
unrelated thoughts during task performance of the block of trials prior to the probe.
Participants were informed that a TUT could be any specific thought which was
unrelated to performance of the primary task, such as considering what they would have
for dinner. In this way, participants only reported TUTs in which they were aware of the
contents of their mind wandering episode. These types of TUT are those which appear
to rely most heavily on input from frontal-executive control resources and, as such,
should be most susceptible to interference from tasks also relying on these resources,
such as task switching.
5.2 EXPERIMENT 11
Experiment 11 aimed to establish the effect of task switching on the experience of task-
unrelated thoughts. It is predicted that the frequency of report of TUTs will be lower
under conditions of task switching versus task repetition.
5.2.1 Method
Participants. Eight participants (18-35) from University College London with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision were paid to participate.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment
3. The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 3, with two exceptions: firstly,92
the flanker task distractor was always response-neutral (the letter P); and secondly, each
of the twelve blocks of trials (six pure and six switch blocks) was divided into two
separate blocks, creating 24 blocks of 48 trials. After each of the 24 blocks participants
were asked whether they had had any TUTs during the preceding block. Participants
pressed Y for yes and N for no on the computer keyboard. The TUT probe occurred 12
times after switch blocks and twelve times after pure blocks (6 times after pure flanker
task blocks and 6 times after pure visual search task blocks).
5.2.2 Results
Table 11 shows mean RTs, percentage error rates and frequency of report of TUTs as a
function of task condition in the three tasks. TUTs are presented as the proportion of yes
answers to the TUT probe after pure and switch blocks.
Table 11: Mean RTs for the visual search task and flanker tasks and proportion of yes
responses to TUT probe as a function of task condition (pure/switch).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task VS Task TUTs
Mean (SD)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 655 (153) 913 (220) 0.80 (0.30)
Errors (%) 4 5
Switch
RT (ms) 934 (368) 1262 (303) 0.50 (0.20)
Errors (%) 4 5
Task switch cost
RT (ms) 279 349 - 0.30
Errors (%) 0 0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------93
Visual search task. As shown in Table 11, visual search RTs were longer in
switch blocks than in pure blocks, F (1, 7) = 35.4, MSE = 13768.5, p < 0.01, revealing a
significant task switch cost. There was no effect of task condition on percentage errors
which were the same in pure and switch trials (see Table 11). As can be seen in Table
11, overall visual search RTs were significantly slower than flanker task RTs, t (7) = -7,
SEM = 41, p < 0.001.
Flanker task. Task condition again had a significant effect on RTs, F (1, 7) =
11.9, MSE = 26137.8, p < 0.05, with longer RTs revealed in the switch versus pure
blocks: a task switch cost. Again, there was no effect of task condition on percentage
errors, which, as can be seen in Table 11, were the same in both pure and switch
conditions.
Task-unrelated thoughts. As predicted, there was a significant effect of task
condition on frequency of report of TUTs, F (1, 7) = 14.4, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.01, with a
higher frequency of TUTs reported after pure versus switch blocks (see Table 11),
establishing that task switching significantly reduced the frequency with which TUTs
were reported.
Since overall RTs were significantly greater in the pure blocks of the visual
search versus flanker task, suggesting greater task difficulty in the visual search task, I
examined the effect of a different source of general task difficulty on TUTs: Was there a
reduced rate of TUTs when task difficulty increased, i.e. in the visual search task? There
was no significant difference between the TUTs reported after pure blocks of the flanker
task than pure blocks of the visual search task, t (7) = -1.8, p = 0.11, although there was
a numerical trend towards increased TUT report after the pure blocks of the visual
search task (0.85) than flanker task (0.71). Note that the direction of the numerical trend
is contrary to that which would be expected if general task difficulty were responsible94
for the revealed decrease in TUTs in switch versus pure trials. This suggests that it is
specifically the executive demand of switching between two tasks which results in a
reduced frequency of report of TUTs, rather than general task difficulty. I return to this
point in Experiment 13, where this trend became significant.
Experiment 11 established support for my hypothesis that fewer TUTs will be
experienced under conditions of task switch versus task repeat conditions.
5.3 EXPERIMENT 12
In Experiment 12 I directly contrasted the effects of task switching on external versus
internal distraction. I predict both increased distractor interference in the flanker task
and, conversely, reduced distraction from TUTs under task switch versus task repetition
conditions.
5.3.1 Method
Participants. Ten participants (18-35) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
from University College London were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as Experiment
11, with the exception that the distractor in the flanker task was not a neutral P, but
either an X or a Z, creating the opportunity to observe the effects of the response-
competitive distractor on target RTs.
5.3.2 Results
Table 12 shows mean RTs, percentage error rates and frequency of report of TUTs as a
function of the experimental conditions. TUTs are presented as the proportion of yes95
answers to the TUT probe. Two participants were removed from the analysis because
their flanker effects in the pure blocks were very large (310 and 323 ms) compared to
the group average (M = 46 ms, SD = 78 ms).
Table 12: Mean RTs for the visual search and flanker tasks and proportion of yes
responses to TUT probe as a function of task condition (pure/switch) and congruency in
the flanker task (congruent/incongruent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task VS Task TUTs
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 811 (237) 834 (219) 788 (261) 46 934 (296) 0.70 (0.30)
Errors (%) 9 11 6 5 7
Switch
RT (ms) 1138 (553) 1209 (553) 1066 (557) 143 1296 (654) 0.40 (0.30)
Errors (%) 8 9 6 3 5
Switch cost
RT (ms) 327 362 -0.30
Errors (%) -1 -2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = incongruent, C = congruent.
Visual search task. Visual search RTs were longer in switch than pure blocks, F
(1, 9) = 8.2, MSE = 79917.2, p < 0.01, revealing a significant task switching cost. More
errors were committed in the pure than switch blocks, F (1, 9) = 6.4, MSE = 2.5, p <
0.05, although this 2% difference is unlikely to account for the RT task switch cost as a
speed-accuracy trade-off, especially since significant task switch related RT costs were
revealed in Experiment 11 in the visual search task without any difference in errors
between task conditions.96
As can be seen in Table 12, overall RTs were significantly greater in the pure
visual search task trials compared to pure flanker task trials, t (9) = 2.5, p < 0.05.
Flanker task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (congruency) within-subject ANOVA
revealed significantly longer RTs in both the switch versus pure blocks, F (1, 9) = 10.4,
MSE = 103215.8, p < 0.05, and in the incongruent versus congruent distractor
conditions, F (1, 9) = 39.3, MSE = 2281.2, p < 0.001, establishing both a significant
task switching cost and a significant congruency effect in the flanker task.
Critically, as predicted, there was an interaction between task condition and
distractor congruency, F (1, 9) = 5.6, MSE = 4230.0, p < 0.05, with greater distractor
effects in task-switch than pure task conditions, replicating Experiment 3 (see Table 12).
When the congruency effects were calculated as proportions of the congruent RTs, in
order to eliminate the possibility of explaining the results in terms of a scaling account,
the increase in congruency was still marginally significant, t (9) = -1.7, p = 0.065, one-
tailed.
The error ANOVA only replicated the congruency effect, F (1, 9) = 7.4, MSE =
0.001, p < 0.05, with more errors occurring in the incongruent versus congruent trials,
(for task condition, F (1, 9) = 1.2, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.31, for the interaction between
flanker congruency and task condition, F (1, 9) = 3.9, MSE = 0.000, p = 0.08).
Task-unrelated thoughts. Table 12 clearly shows the significant effect of task
condition on frequency of report of TUTs, t (9) = 6.2, SEM = 0.04, p < 0.001: as
predicted, more TUTs were reported in pure blocks than switch blocks.
2
2 When this analysis was performed on all 12 participants including the two outliers TUTs were still
significantly greater in pure than switch blocks, F (1, 11) = 23.1, MSE = 0.13, p < 0.01. All other
ANOVAs were also performed on all 12 participants with only one difference in the results to those
reported above. With all 12 participants the congruency x task condition interaction was not significant, F
(1, 11) = 2.3, MSE = 5074, p = 0.16, showing no significant effect of task switching on distractor
interference effects.97
Due to the significant increase in RTs in the pure trials in the visual search task
versus the flanker task, TUTs were compared between these two conditions to examine
the effect of task difficulty on TUTs. There was no significant difference in TUTs
between the flanker task (0.63) and visual search task (0.70), t < 1, supporting the view
that it is specifically the executive demand of a task switch which is responsible for the
decrease in TUTs in switch versus pure trials.
Experiment 12 offers support to the hypothesis that task switching will
conversely increase distraction from external sources, such as flanker interference,
whilst decreasing distraction from internal sources, such as TUTs.
5.4 EXPERIMENT 13
In Experiment 13 I examined whether the dissociation between increased external
distractor interference and decreased internal distractor interference under task switch
conditions can be replicated with a different measure of external distractor interference,
namely the attentional capture task. I predict that task switching will result in increased
interference from singleton distractors, partnered with decreased interference from
TUTs.
5.4.1 Method
Participants. Eight participants (18-35) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision from University College London were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as Experiment
4, with the exception that each of the 12 experimental blocks was split into two and98
each of the subsequent 24 blocks was followed by a TUT probe, following the
procedure of Experiment 11.
5.4.2 Results
Table 13 shows mean RTs, percentage error rates, and proportion of positive TUT
report following the probe, as a function of task condition (pure/switch) and singleton
presence (absent/present). One participant was removed from the analysis because their
singleton effect in the pure condition was abnormally large (210 ms) compared to the
group mean (M = 54 ms, SD = 69 ms).
Table 13: Mean RTs for the visual search and flanker tasks, and proportion of yes
responses to TUT probe, as a function of task condition (pure/switch), singleton
presence (absent/present).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attentional capture task Flanker task TUTs
Mean (SD) P A (P-A)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 890 (119) 917 (123) 863 (121) 54 530 (53) 0.50 (0.30)
Errors (%) 5 6 4 2 4
Switch
RT (ms) 1145 (210) 1208 (213) 1082 (214) 126 860 (207) 0.40 (0.30)
Errors (%) 6 6 6 0 3
Switch cost
RT (ms) 255 330 -0.10
Errors (%) -1 -1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A = singleton absent, P = singleton present.99
Flanker task. RTs were significantly affected by task condition, F (1, 7) = 19.8,
MSE = 21976.1, p < 0.01, being longer in switch blocks than in pure blocks, revealing a
significant task switching cost. No difference in percentage errors between switch and
pure blocks, F < 1, was revealed. Also note that pure trial RTs in the flanker task were
significantly faster than in the visual search task, t (7) = -9.0, SEM = 40, p < 0.001.
Attentional capture task. A 2 (task condition) x 2 (singleton presence) within-
subject ANOVA revealed significantly longer RTs in the switch versus pure blocks, F
(1, 7) = 26.2, MSE = 19914.1, p < 0.01: a significant task switching cost. Longer RTs
were also revealed in the incongruent versus congruent distractor conditions, F (1, 7) =
16.4, MSE = 3633.1, p < 0.01, showing a significant effect of singleton presence on
RTs.
An interaction between singleton presence and task condition, F (1, 7) = 10.7,
MSE = 959.1, p < 0.05, replicated the findings of greater singleton effects in task-switch
than pure task conditions observed in Experiment 4, supporting the prediction that
externally generated distraction would increase in switch versus pure blocks. This
increase in singleton effects under task switch conditions was significant even when the
possibility of explaining the RT interaction by a scaling account was addressed by
calculating the congruency effects as proportions of the congruent RTs, t (7) = -2.6, p <
0.05, one-tailed.
The error ANOVA did not replicate any of these effects: F (1, 7) = 2.6, MSE =
0.00, p = 0.15, for the main effect of task condition; F (1, 7) = 2.5, MSE = 0.00, p =
0.16 for the main effect of singleton presence; F (1, 7) = 2.4, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.28 for
the interaction between flanker congruency and task condition.100
Task-unrelated thoughts. Contrary to the findings of Experiment 12, there was
no difference in the frequency of TUTs after pure blocks versus switch blocks, F < 1, as
can clearly be seen in Table 13.
3
Interestingly, although there was no effect of switch on TUTs, there were
significantly more TUTs reported after the visual search task (0.52) than after the
neutral flanker task (0.37), t (7) = -3.0, SEM = 0.05, p < 0.05, suggesting that, contrary
to the reduction in TUTs after loading executive control with a task switch, increasing
another source of task difficulty actually increased the number of TUTs reported. This
dissociation between the effects of task switching and another source of task difficulty
on TUTs supports the view that it is specifically the executive load of task switching
which increases external and decreases internal distraction on switch trials, and not
another source of task difficulty in switch versus pure blocks. Despite this significant
increase in TUTs after the visual search pure trials compared to flanker task pure trials,
there was still no effect of switching on TUTs when comparing the switch trials to the
visual search task pure trials, t (7) = -1.5, SEM = 0.08, p = 0.20. However, the increase
in TUTs with increased task difficulty could result simply from the prolonged RTs in
the visual search task: longer blocks of visual search than flanker pure trials would have
resulted in a longer time in which TUTs could occur before the probe after the visual
search task than flanker task pure blocks. Alternatively, greater vigilance in the flanker
task might have resulted in both faster RTs and less TUTs. Without further experiments
the effect of visual search task difficulty on TUTs is purely post hoc and any
explanations are speculative.
3 When the outlier was included in the analyses all results were the same as reported here (there was still
no difference in TUTs between the pure and switch trials, F (1, 8) <1) with the exception that the
interaction between singleton presence and task condition was only marginally significant, F (1, 8) = 4.6,
MSE = 1470, p = 0.064.101
It is important to note that Experiment 13 replicates the findings of Experiment 4
with no significant differences in the percentage errors rates. Experiment 13 suggests
that the greater task switch RT costs and the greater singleton capture RT effects in
switch than pure trials revealed in Experiment 4 are not due to a speed-accuracy trade-
off.
Experiment 13 failed to replicate the decrease in TUTs during task switching
which was revealed in Experiments 11 and 12.
5.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
Reducing the availability of executive control by switching between the flanker task and
a visual search task conversely increased distraction from external sources and reduced
internal distraction. Whilst prevention of distraction from external visual distractors is
controlled by executive resources, these resources appear not to be involved in the
prevention of distraction from internal distractors. Instead, executive control is required
in order to generate and/or control internal distraction in the form of TUTs.
Interestingly, switches between the attentional capture task and a neutral flanker
task did not result in less frequently reported TUTs. Whilst this at first seems surprising,
given that previous experiments suggest that attentional capture effects rely on
executive control processes required in mixing tasks, it may be that TUTs rather rely on
the executive control processes involved in switching between tasks, which are relied on
for successful flanker task performance. Performance of both the switch requirement102
and the flanker task would produce a far greater load on these (possibly more transient)
executive processes than the combined performance of the attentional capture task and
task switching because the attentional capture task does not load on these particular
executive processes. Indeed, if executive control were simply involved in the initiation
of TUTs then this might involve only transient control processes.
The TUT measure used in the current study may be more sensitive to the
availability of transient executive processes compared to sustained executive processes,
because the TUT probe asks only whether participants experienced TUTs in the block
prior to the TUT probe. The elements of TUTs which might be affected by more
sustained control processes, such as the length and depth of processing involved in the
mind wandering episode, are not measured using the current method. An interesting
avenue for future research would be to measure the contents and length of TUTs, rather
than purely their presence or absence. These aspects of mind wandering might load
more on the sustained executive control associated with attentional capture and thus
reveal a dissociation between the effects of task switching on TUTs and attentional
capture.
Note that Experiment 12 also suggests that increased distraction from external
distractors in switch conditions is not due to increased task difficulty: increasing
executive load (and concurrently task difficulty) only increases distraction if this
distraction is from external sources. If it were the case that increasing task difficulty
necessarily resulted in increased distraction then both external and internal distraction
would be increased. Additionally, another source of task difficulty, as reflected by
significantly greater RTs in the visual search than flanker task in Experiments 11 and
12, was not associated with decreased TUTs. These findings support the view that it is103
specifically the executive demand associated with a switch between tasks which reduces
TUTs in switch versus pure blocks.104
CHAPTER 6
Individual Differences in Working Memory
Capacity, Task Switching Cost, and
Distractibility105
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 6 I examined how individual differences in working memory capacity relate
to the task switch cost and distractibility in selective attention tasks. Working memory
capacity was assessed using the operation span task (Ospan), which measures the
availability of executive resources to control performance of a primary task (e.g.
maintain task relevant information and task goals) in the face of distraction (e.g. from an
ongoing task, such as manipulating numbers in equations; e.g. Engle, 2002). If it is the
case that task switching and distractor rejection in selective attention tasks both rely on
executive resources, then lower Ospan scorers should show greater RT deficits in
conditions involving switching tasks and interference from distractors.
Tasks relying on executive control in order to respond to a target in the face of
distraction, such as the antisaccade task, the Stroop task, and the dichotic listening task,
correlate with working memory span score. In a colour-word Stroop task (e.g. Stroop,
1935), under conditions where maintenance of the task goal (to name the colour and
avoid reading the word) was made difficult (i.e. in a 75% congruent condition where
reading the word gave the correct answer in 75% of trials) low span’s performance was
detrimentally affected on incongruent trials, with low-spans making nearly twice as
many errors as high-spans. However, when the task goal was easy to maintain (i.e. in a
0% and a 50% congruent condition) there was no such advantage (Kane & Engle,
2003). Low working memory spans were less able to maintain the task goal of naming
the colour in the face of interference from the more practised task of reading the word.
In a dichotic listening task, where participants attend to information in one ear
whilst ignoring the information in the other ear, 65% of low-spans heard their name
when it occurred in the unattended stream, compared to only 20% of high-spans: low-106
spans were less able to reject the distracting information and focus on the current task
goal (Conway, Cohen, & Bunting, 2001).
The antisaccade task requires inhibition of the strong tendency to shift attention
to sudden onsets. Participants fixate centrally and targets appear on either the left or
right side of fixation. Critically, before stimulus onset there is a sudden onset cue which
can appear on the side where the target will appear, called the prosaccade condition, or
on the opposite side, called the antisaccade condition. The automatic tendency of the
visual system to orient to the cue (both with eye movements and attention) facilitates
task performance in the prosaccade condition, but is detrimental to task performance in
the antisaccade condition. Whilst no difference has been revealed for low- and high-
working memory spans on task performance in the prosaccade condition, participants
who score low (vs. high) on the working memory span task were more detrimentally
affected by the need to avoid making a conflicting response when performing the
antisaccade condition (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001), again supporting the
view that low-spans have less executive control to maintain target information in the
face of distractor interference.
Further studies have suggested that whereas high-spans use their executive
control ability to protect them from distractor interference, low-spans cannot or do not.
Under conditions of cognitive load (i.e. dual-task performance) high-span’s
performance was reduced to that of low span’s, but low-span performance was
unaffected (Kane & Engle, 2000).
Interestingly, despite the effect of executive capacity (working memory span) on
dual-task performance (e.g. Kane & Engle, 2000), and the findings reviewed in the
general introduction that varying working memory load modulates task switching
performance (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Hester & Garavan, 2005), most107
previous research has found no correlation between working memory capacity and task
switch cost (Kane and Engle, 2000; Oberauer, SuB, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann,
2000; Oberauer, SuB, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003; Miyake et al., 2000). Oberauer et
al. (2003) revealed that task-set switching variables, taken as a measure of executive
supervision processes, were only weakly related to other working memory functions,
such as storage/processing and coordination, suggesting that the underlying cause of RT
slowing in switch trials cannot be attributed to general working memory capacity.
Similarly, no positive correlation was revealed between a latent ‘mental-set-shifting’
variable statistically extracted from three different switching tasks (the plus-minus task,
Jersild, 1927; the letter-number task, Rogers & Monsell, 1995; and the local-global
task) and Ospan (Miyake et al., 2000). Miyake and colleagues argue that this mental-
set-shifting latent variable, and information updating and monitoring (loaded on by the
Ospan) are executive functions which are separable, and performance on tasks requiring
different executive functions will not necessarily correlate. Using three numerical
Stroop tasks and four experiments with the Rogers and Monsell (1995) alternating runs
task, Engle and colleagues also failed to reveal any effects of working memory span on
task switching RT costs (Kane & Engle, 2000). These findings are a little surprising,
given that the research just reviewed supports working memory span as a measure of
the ability of executive control to activate/maintain task-relevant information in the face
of interference from task-irrelevant information (e.g. Conway, Cohen, & Bunting, 2001;
Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2000; 2001). Task switching
should involve this general executive control capacity and the lack of relationship
between working memory capacity and task switching ability casts doubt on the idea of
a general resource for maintaining information in the face of distraction (e.g. Oberauer
et al., 2003).108
However, in these previous experiments, which did not reveal an effect of
working memory span on the task switch cost (Kane and Engle, 2000; Oberauer et al.,
2003; Miyake et al., 2000), task switching involved a confound between task cues and
switch cues. For example, using the classic Rogers and Monsell (1995) alternating runs
paradigm (AABB…), where a specific location cued which of two tasks should be
performed on the stimulus (letter/digit pairs), Kane and Engle (2002) failed to find an
effect of working memory span on task switch RT costs, and Oberauer et al. (2003)
found only a weak correlation between task switching and working memory tasks.
Logan and colleagues (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2004; Logan & Bundeson, 2003; Logan
& Schneider, 2006) have argued that combining the task cue and the stimulus cue in this
type of paradigm allows the correct answer simply to be retrieved from long term
memory based on the reinstatement of the previous stimulus-location-response binding
episode. If the top right location cued a response to the letter in the letter/digit pair, then
whenever the stimulus 3A appeared in the top right location then the answer was
always, for example, A. Thus, there is no executive requirement to activate the correct
task-set, simply the need to retrieve the correct stimulus-location-response mapping
from memory. Task switch costs in this theory are considered to reflect the cost of
encoding the new task cue in the switch trial, as compared to repeating the same task,
which requires no cue-encoding. Note that executive control involved in retrieval from
LTM, in this argument, is the same across pure and switch trials and, as such, cannot
explain the switch costs revealed.
In order to reveal an effect of working memory capacity on task switching the
availability of a composite cue which can trigger retrieval of the correct response
without the need to activate the correct task-set must be removed. In such a way, the109
executive demands of a task switch will be increased and task switching should rely
more heavily on the availability of executive control.
Kane and Engle (2004) addressed this issue in a cleverly conceived experiment
in which task cues and stimulus cues were separated such that correct responses could
not simply be retrieved from memory, and thus increased the executive requirements of
task switching. Switching was cued by location, as in previous experiments, with the
difference that there were only three possible locations and two possible tasks. As such,
each location did not itself cue a particular task, rather the correct task was cued simply
by the change in location. For example, in this paradigm, although the top position was
associated with one task on one trial, the next time the stimulus appeared in the top
location it cued the other task, (Kane & Engle, 2004). Removing the specific task cues
in this way (and so removing the possibility to respond using the stimulus-location-
response binding recalled from memory) increases the executive load of switching. This
manipulation revealed a significant effect of Ospan on task switching costs in both RTs
and errors, with low spans showing significantly greater task switch costs compared to
high spans.
Whilst previous studies have investigated the effects of working memory span
on distraction in tasks such as the antisaccade, Stroop, and dichotic listening tasks,
which involve responding in line with a task goal whilst avoiding distraction from
invalid cues, strong response tendencies and salient information, respectively, no studies
at the time of testing had investigated the effect of working memory span on distractor
interference effects in the response competition task. However, Heitz and Engle (2007),
in an elegant study investigated the mechanism by which working memory capacity
affects distractor interference. They revealed no interaction between working memory
span and either RTs or errors on the flanker task, but high working memory spans110
reached peak performance in the incongruent trials in terms of accuracy significantly
faster than low spans. They argue that the difference between the working memory span
groups reflects slower attentional focusing in the low than high spans. As such they
suggest that executive control will only affect flanker task RTs when responding occurs
within the response time frame in which visual attention has started, but not yet
finished, focusing. In terms of the current study, I claim, instead, that whilst the time
taken to constrict the window of attention may modulate the effect of working memory
span on distractor interference effects, this does not rule out an effect of working
memory span on overall distractor interference effects in RTs or errors. Consider that in
the current study, unlike the study of Heitz and Engle (2007) where there was
considerable time pressure to perform the flanker task as fast as possible, accuracy was
emphasised as more important than speed in responding to the flanker task. Thus, in
incongruent trials, high spans, due to their attention focusing more quickly and so
leaving the distractor outside of their window of attention, will more quickly reach a
level of certainty regarding the correct response to the flanker task compared to low
spans. This will reduce high spans distractor interference RT effects compared to low
spans.
The current study investigates the effect of working memory span on task
switching costs and distractor interference effects in the flanker task. If both task
switching and distractor interference rely on executive control then low working
memory span should correlate with larger task switching costs and greater interference
from distractors.111
6.1 EXPERIMENT 14
In Experiment 14 I investigate how individual differences in working memory span
effect task switching costs and distractor interference effects. The hypothesis that
executive load results in larger costs of task switching in terms of both RTs and
distractor interference effects leads to the expectation that individuals with low working
memory span (low-spans) will show more interference from irrelevant distractors and
greater effects of switching on RTs than high-spans. I predict greater distractor
interference effects in the flanker task along with greater task switching costs for low-
versus high-spans.
6.1.1 Method
Participants. Sixty two participants (18 – 35) with normal or corrected to normal
vision, who responded to an advert in the Gumtree online magazine, or were
undergraduate students from University College London, were paid for their
participation.
Materials. The standardised Automated Operation Span task (Ospan; Unsworth,
Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) was presented on a computer screen. Subjects
responded by writing the words they remembered on a standardised Automated
Operation Span response sheet (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were the same as in
Experiment 3, except participants also performed the Automated Operation Span task
(Ospan). Participants were randomly divided so that half of the participants performed
the Automated Operation Span task immediately before the RT experiment, and half
immediately after the RT experiment. Participants were presented with serially112
presented equation-word trials (e.g. IS (2 + 6) – 3 = 5 ? Cloud). On each trial
participants read the equation out loud, gave their answer out loud (yes or no), and then
read the word out loud (e.g. “Is 2 plus 6 minus 3 equal to 5? Yes. Cloud.”). After each
equation-word trial was completed the experimenter pressed a key and the next trial was
presented on the screen. Equation-word trials were presented and completed by the
participant in sets of between 2 and 5. Participants were blind as to how many equation-
word trials would be in each set. After each set participants saw 3 question marks in the
centre of the screen which was the cue to write down all of the words they remembered
from that set on the standardised response sheet. The partial-credit unit (PCU) scoring
method was used to score the Ospan (see Conway et al., 2001)
4. For each set of words
recalled, a proportion score was given, so that if a subject scored 3 out of 5 on one set
they scored 0.6 for that set. The final score was the average of the proportions on each
of the 12 sets.
6.1.2 Results
Overall results. Table 14 shows the overall RTs and percentage errors for the
flanker task as a function of task condition and congruency.
4 The all or nothing method (ANL; the sum of recalled words only from those sets recalled fully and in
the correct order) used by Engle and colleagues (e.g. Kane and Engle, 2003) was not used because the
range of ANL Ospan scores in my population (4-37 out of a possible 60) was more limited than that
established by Engle and colleagues on student populations across America (2-54; see Kane and Engle,
2003, page 51). This was a result of my population being mostly gathered from the general population,
and not all students. High spans in my population had a range of 15-37, compared to the normal high span
range of 19-54, strongly suggesting that my population had limited variance in their working memory
ability. Thus, the ANL scoring method resulted in reduced variance in the Ospan score (with only 14
unique ANL values in the low and high span groups combined). Using the PCU method increased the
variance in the scores, resulting in 23 unique PCU values for the low and high spans combined and high
spans scored up to 0.98 out of 1.00. NB: results were the same using both scoring methods, with two
exceptions: i) congruency x Ospan was only marginally significant with the ANL method (p = 0.06),
possibly due to the ceiling effect in the ANL scores; ii) none of the correlations with Ospan were
significant with ANL, due to the reduced variance in ANL versus PCU scores.113
Table 14: RTs and percentage errors in the flanker task and visual search task as a
function of task condition and congruency.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task Visual Search Task
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 692 (125) 737 (134) 647 (121) 90 824 (151)
Errors (%) 5.5 7 4 3 6
Switch
RT (ms) 938 (165) 995 (175) 881 (160) 114 1031 (189)
Errors (%) 4.5 6 3 3 3
Switch cost
RT (ms) 246 207
Errors (%) -1 -3
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = incongruent, C = Congruent.
Visual search task. Two within-subjects ANOVAs performed on the upper and
lower tiertiles of the population (N = 42) revealed a significant effect of task condition
on both the visual search RTs, F (1, 41) = 167, MSE = 5367, p < 0.001, and errors, F (1,
41) = 45, MSE = 0, p < 0.001. This result replicates the task switch cost revealed in
previous experiments but with a large sample size.
Flanker task. RT and error data were analysed with two within-subjects
ANOVAs performed on the upper and lower tiertiles of the population (N = 42). The
RT ANOVA revealed a significant effect of task condition, F (1, 41) = 371, MSE =
6862, p < 0.001, with longer RTs in switch compared to pure trials, replicating the task
switch cost with this large sample size. Longer RTs in the incongruent than congruent
trials also established a significant effect of congruency, F (1, 41) = 188, MSE = 2303, p114
< 0.001, replicating the detrimental effect of incongruent distractors on RTs in selective
attention tasks.
There was a significant interaction between task condition and congruency, F (1,
41) = 8, MSE = 741, p < 0.01, with a greater effect of incongruent distractors in the
switch than pure trials. This interaction was not replicated when the flanker effect was
taken as a proportion of the congruent RTs in pure (14%) and switch (13%) trials, t (41)
= 0.8, SEM = 0.01, p = 0.4, thus not ruling out the scaling effect as an explanation for
the increased flanker effects in the switch condition, where RTs were significantly
longer than in the pure condition. However, given that my population, sampled from a
mostly non-student population, had a ceiling effect in Ospan compared to a large
number of previous student populations sampled by Engle and colleagues (see Kane &
Engle, 2003; see footnote 2, p. 110), it is possible that these participants performed less
well on the selective attention task in the pure blocks compared to the student
populations used in my previous experiments. Indeed, percentage distractor interference
effects in the pure blocks in the current experiment (14%) were significantly increased
compared to the student population sampled in Experiment 3 (9%), t (59) = -2.0, p =
0.05, where the range of working memory spans would have been more similar to the
student populations used by Engle and colleagues (see Kane & Engle, 2003). This
significant increase in pure percentage flanker effects in Experiment 14 reduces the
difference between the flanker percentages in the pure and switch conditions and
eliminates the previously revealed significant difference in percentage flanker effects
between pure and switch blocks.
Individual differences in Ospan. High- and low-span participants were identified
on the basis of their performance on the Automated Operation Span task. Following the
method of Conway et al. (2001), the overall partial-credit score of each participant was115
converted into a z-score. Based on these z-scores the group was split into three tiertiles:
participants in the top tiertile (Ospan z-score higher than 0.7) were included in the high
working memory span group; those in the bottom tiertile (Ospan z-score of less than -
0.7) were included in the low Ospan group. Low-span scores ranged from 0.59 to 0.73
(M = 0.67, sd = 0.05, n = 24) and high-span scores ranged from 0.85 to 0.98 (M = 0.89,
sd = 0.04, n = 18).
Table 15 shows the flanker task RTs and percentage errors for both Ospan
groups as a function of task condition and congruency.
Table 15: RTs and percentage errors in the flanker task and visual search task as a
function of task condition, congruency and working memory span group
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flanker Task Visual Search Task
Mean (SD) I C (I-C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low Ospan
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 702 (113) 754 (123) 651 (110) 103 834 (131)
Errors (%) 5 6 4 2 5
Switch
RT (ms) 975 (159) 1037 (170) 912 (154) 126 1049 (207)
Errors (%) 4.5 6 3 3 3
Switch cost
RT (ms) 273 215
Errors (%) -0.5 -2
High Ospan
Task condition
Pure
RT (ms) 678 (141) 713 (147) 642 (136) 71 811 (178)
Errors (%) 6.5 8 5 3 6
Switch
RT (ms) 890 (166) 938 (170) 841 (165) 97 1005 (165)
Errors (%) 5.5 7 4 3 4
Switch cost
RT (ms) 212 194116
Errors (%) -0.5 -2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I = Incongruent, C = Congruent.
Visual search task. Although the low Ospan group showed slower overall RTs
(942 ms) compared to high spans (908 ms), this numerical trend was not significant, t <
1. Overall percentage errors were also not significantly different between low (4) and
high (5) spans, t (40) = 1.3, p = 0.20. A numerical trend for low spans to show greater
RT costs when task switching (see Table 15), also did not reach significance: Ospan did
not affect the RT nor error task switch cost in the visual search task, t < 1 for both RTs
and errors.
Flanker task. A numerical trend towards slower overall RTs in the low (838 ms)
versus high (783 ms) Ospan groups did not reach significance, t (40) = 1.3, p = 0.20.
Overall errors in the flanker task were also not significantly different for low (4.75) and
high (6) spans, t (40) = 1.4, p = 0.16.
A 2 (task condition) x 2 (congruency) x 2 (Ospan: high/low) mixed measures
ANOVA was performed on the RT data for the flanker task. As predicted there was a
significant interaction between Ospan and task condition, F (1, 40) = 6.2, MSE = 6087,
p < 0.05, with task switching costs significantly greater in the low span group than in
the high span group. In addition, when the full range of Ospan scores was taken into
account in the assessment of the correlation between Ospan and task switch cost, there
was a significant negative correlation between Ospan score and task switch cost, r = -
0.31, n = 62, p < 0.05, as can clearly be seen in Figure 2: as Ospan scores increased task
switch costs decreased.117
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Figure 2: Task switching costs in the flanker task as a function of Ospan score.
Table 15 also demonstrates the significant interaction between Ospan and
congruency in the flanker task RTs, F (1, 40) = 4.4, MSE = 2127, p < 0.05, with low
spans showing greater RT interference in the presence of incongruent distractors than
high spans, as predicted. The correlation between Ospan and congruency effects did not
reach significance, r = -0.20, n = 62, p = 0.12, although the nonsignificant trend for
increased congruency effects with increased Ospan score can be seen in Figure 3. Given
that there was a significant interaction between Ospan group (low and high) and
congruency, the lack of correlation is likely due to the inclusion of the middle range
Ospan scorers who were not included in the Ospan score tiertile analysis.118
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Figure 3: Congruency effects (incongruent – congruent RTs) as a function of Ospan
score.
There was no 3-way interaction between Ospan, task condition, and congruency,
F < 1: Both high and low scorers on the Ospan task showed a similar effect of task
switching on distractor interference effects (low spans showed a 23 ms increase in
distractor interference in switch versus pure blocks, and high spans showed an increase
of 26 ms).
For all interactions between the flanker task percentage errors and working
memory span F < 1.
It is interesting to note that high-spans in the switching blocks behaved similarly
to low-spans in the pure blocks, with no significant difference between distractor
interference effects in low span pure blocks (103 ms) and high span switch blocks (97119
ms), t (40) = -3.7, p < 0.001, suggesting that the requirement to task switch artificially
removed the advantage in ignoring distractors seen in high-span compared to low-span
participants.
The results of Experiment 14 support the prediction that low Ospans will show
greater task switching costs and greater congruency effects than high Ospans.
6.2 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
Both the ability to efficiently switch between tasks and to respond to a target and reject
distractors in a selective attention task were detrimentally affected in participants with
low working memory span (executive capacity), when compared to those with a
relatively high executive capacity. This supports the prediction that task switching and
the ability to selectively attend to a target and reject distractors both rely on executive
control. The greater executive capacity of individuals with high working memory spans
allowed them to more effectively avoid distraction and preserve their RT performance,
to some degree, from being affected by the requirement to switch between two tasks
(compared to the low-span participants).
Task switching may serve to artificially eliminate the advantage high span
individuals benefit from when rejecting distractors in a selective attention task, by
reducing their executive capacity to that of low spans. Interference from distractors was
the same for the high spans when they performed a switch between tasks as it was for
the low spans when they simply repeated performance of one task. Thus, once a task
switch has been performed by high spans, they have similar executive capacity available
for performing the selective attention task as low spans under no executive demand, and
as such will not perform differently on a selective attention task.120
Perhaps surprisingly, performance on a selective attention task in individuals
with relatively low working memory spans was not more detrimentally affected than
high spans performance when there was the additional demand of carrying out a switch
between tasks compared to when performing one task repeatedly. Despite task
switching reducing high spans to low spans normal performance, when low spans then
performed a task switch, their selective attention performance was affected to a similar
degree by task switching as was that of the high spans. Kane and Engle (2000) revealed
a reduction in high-span’s ability to avoid proactive interference under cognitive load,
but conversely to in the current study, this was coupled with no effect of cognitive load,
leading them to suggest that low spans do not use executive control to avoid distraction,
unlike high-spans. If the low-span participants in the current study were not using their
executive control to avoid distraction in the flanker task, then reducing the availability
of executive control in task switch conditions should not have affected their
performance. As it was, there was no significant difference in the effect of task
switching on distractor interference effects between low- and high-spans: low-span’s
selective attention performance was affected by task switching to the same extent, if not
more, than the high-span’s. These findings, in juxtaposition to Kane and Engle’s,
suggest that while high-span’s use their relatively greater executive ability to aid in
rejecting interference from distractors, low-span’s also use their executive control,
although perhaps less effectively or with smaller resources, to protect them, to some
extent, from distraction. A similar executive demand from the requirement to switch
tasks, therefore, resulted in a similar reduction in selective attention performance for
both working memory span groups.
Whilst it appears that high span’s executive capacity did not save them from the
effects of task switching on distractor interference, alternatively, it is possible that there121
was a ceiling effect, with low-spans under task switching conditions in the presence of
an incongruent distractor reaching the point at which greater distraction no longer
increased RTs. Whilst there was no significant difference, the low spans did show a
slightly higher difference in congruency effects between switch and pure conditions
(low spans 31 ms; high spans 24 ms). Additionally, the ceiling effect in operational
working memory span scores in the current population may have hidden a difference
between high and low operational working memory span scorers by reducing the
difference between the high and low span groups.
Interestingly, the interaction between working memory span and task switching
was only revealed in the flanker task, but not in the visual search task. Perhaps high-
spans directed their extra capacity onto the harder task and prepared more for the task
containing the distractor interference: the flanker task. Kane and Engle (2002) argue
that executive attention’s core function is to maintain target representations and block
distractor interference, supporting the idea that executive resources might be directed
towards the task containing interference from distractors.
The way in which reduced executive capacity limits selective attention ability
has been recently argued to reflect the time taken by executive control to focus the
visual attentional window. Low working memory span participants reach peak
performance (in terms of accuracy) more slowly than high spans, suggesting that the
difference between high and low spans in selective attention performance may at least
partly reflect the speed at which individuals can adjust the size of the focus of attention
(Heitz & Engle, 2007). This is an interesting proposal given our findings, and suggests
more specifically that at least part of the effect of working memory span on selective
attention performance could be due to high spans extra executive capacity resulting in
them more quickly constricting their visual attention. This would allow high span122
participants to more quickly reject the distractor in incongruent trials, due to it more
quickly being outside of the focus of attention. The data partly support this, with the
reduction in interference from distractors in the high spans resulting from a reduction in
RTs on incongruent trials compared to low spans. The effect of loading executive
resources with a requirement to switch between two tasks on selective attention
performance may, therefore, reflect a reduction in the speed at which depleted executive
resources can constrict the focus of attention in switch compared to pure trials.
In conclusion, it seems that the executive control resources required to perform a
switch between tasks are shared, at least to some extent, by attending to a target in the
face of distraction. When the ability to use this executive capacity, or perhaps even its
availability, is reduced in individuals with low working memory spans, then
performance on both task switching and selective attention tasks is detrimentally
affected. However, further research is required to investigate whether high spans
executive capacity will save them from the effects of task switching on selective
attention performance when the possibility of a ceiling effect on low spans performance
under task switching is eliminated, and a high span group with a higher, more normal
(see Kane & Engle, 2003), mean operational working memory span score used.123
CHAPTER 7
General Discussion124
7.1 OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
7.1.1 Executive control of selective attention
The experiments in this thesis provide support for the hypothesis that loading executive
control will reduce selective attention performance by reducing the availability of
executive resources to control distractor rejection. Chapter 2 established that under
conditions of task switching (believed to load on executive control resources, for review
see Monsell, 2003), selective attention performance was detrimentally affected in two
selective attention tasks (the flanker task and the attentional capture task).
In Chapter 3 these findings were extended to situations in which not only the
task stimuli (as in Experiments 1 and 2), but also the responses to the two tasks were
entirely separate and non-overlapping. Interestingly, whilst the effect of task switching
on selective attention performance in both the flanker and attentional capture task
replicated when responses were mixed between the two hands (so that each hand made
responses to both tasks), when the response mappings of the two tasks were separated
between the hands (so that each hand responded to one task only) task switching only
affected selective attention performance in the flanker task, but not in the attentional
capture task. I will return to this point in section 7.1.8.
Chapter 4 more clearly investigated the effect of executive control on selective
attention performance by inter-mixing the conditions of task repeat and task switch in
the same block in an AAABBB… design. This design reduced the possible
contributions of between block effects to the task switching cost. Large and significant
task switch costs and distractor interference effects were still revealed under these
conditions, suggesting that it is specifically the executive demand of a switch between
tasks which results in the reaction time and distractibility costs of task switching.125
Chapter 4 also suggested that the two selective attention tasks rely on control input from
different executive resources. Whereas the flanker task appears to rely on input from the
(possibly transient) executive resources also required for a switch between tasks, the
attentional capture task appears to rely, rather, on the (possibly more sustained)
executive resources required by mixing tasks within a block (see section 7.1.8).
Chapter 5 made a distinction between the roles of executive control in rejecting
distraction from external (e.g. visual distractors) versus internal (e.g. task-unrelated
thoughts) sources. This chapter demonstrated that task switching has opposing effects
on internal versus external distraction: whereas task switching increases interference
from external visual distractors, it decreases interference from internal distraction in the
form of TUTs.
The effect of individual differences in working memory capacity on task
switching and selective attention performance was revealed in Chapter 6. High working
memory capacity appeared to protect individuals, to some extent, from the detrimental
effects of task switching and from distraction in the flanker selective attention task.
7.1.2 An additional cost of task switching
The current study highlights a novel cost of switching between two tasks, namely
greater distractibility in a task when switching between performance of that task and
another task than when performing one task alone. There is an extensive literature
addressing the effect of task switching on reaction times in the tasks switched between,
but no study has specifically addressed the effects of task switching on selective
attention performance. This novel finding has important implications for selective
attention research: clearly, one of the determinants of the ability to ignore distractors is126
the extent to which a task is performed in isolation, or performed inter-mixed with other
tasks.
7.1.3 Executive control in task switching
Despite a large body of research it has remained a contentious issue to what extent
executive control can account for the costs associated with task switching. The current
study provides support for the role of executive control in task switching in several
ways: firstly, task switching affected another task thought to load on executive control:
selective attention ability (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004), suggesting this aspect was
shared between the two tasks; secondly, even when task switching occurred in
conditions which were not conducive to the carryover of activation associated with
previous task sets, triggered by overlapping stimuli or responses, task switching still
instigated a considerable RT cost, suggesting the cost is due to a more general resource
that is loaded by task switching; thirdly, task switching affected two different types of
distraction, namely task-unrelated thoughts and distractor interference, in opposite
ways, as would be predicted by task switching loading on executive control resources;
and lastly, individual differences in operational working memory capacity, believed to
reflect executive control ability (e.g. Engle, 2002), predicted task switching
performance.
The current findings do not rule out contributions to the task switch cost of
priming or carryover of activation/inhibition associated with a previous task-set. Indeed,
switch costs are likely to reflect a combination of factors, including, primarily, the
requirement for executive resources to control a switch between tasks, the need for
executive control to mix tasks within a block, as well as the contribution of other costs
under more specific circumstances, such as the cost associated with performing the first127
trial of a task and carryover of activation associated with a previous task-set, to name
but a few. The current study strongly supports an important contribution to task switch
costs of the executive control demand of switching between tasks.
7.1.4 Task mixing costs versus specific task switching costs
The current study suggests that the overall task switching cost, when measured between
blocks, may be contributed to not only by the specific requirement to switch between
tasks, but also by the RT cost associated with mixing tasks within a block (Kray &
Lindenberger, 2000; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; for review see Rubin and Meiran,
2005). The mixing cost is measured by comparing the pure trial RTs in a pure block,
and the nonswitch trial RTs in an AAABBB block. Chapter 4 revealed that whilst there
was a large contribution to the between-task task switch cost from a specific task switch
cost in the experiments in Chapters 2 and 3, there was also a contribution from the cost
of mixing tasks. In other words, RTs in the pure trials in pure blocks were faster than in
the nonswitch trials in AAABBB blocks, reflecting a cost associated with mixing tasks
within the same block. In the task switching literature many authors argue that this
mixing cost reflects an executive demand associated with mixing tasks, because it
involves comparing a condition where response can be almost automatic and one where
response occurs in a task context demanding of control (Rubin & Meiran, 2005), and
thus mixing tasks incurs a RT cost. Indeed, support for this contention from the current
study comes from the finding that attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton is
modulated by the requirement to mix tasks within a block.
Interestingly, in the literature there is a distinction made between the executive
demand required by switching tasks, and the executive demand required by mixing
tasks (Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Kray &128
Lindenberger, 2000; Logan & Bundeson, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). Whereas the
specific task switching cost is argued to load on transient control processes (Braver,
Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Logan & Bundeson, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003),
mixing tasks, on the other hand, is contended to load on more sustained or global
control processes (Braver et al., 2003; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Kray &
Lindenberger, 2000, although see Rubin & Meiran, 2005), such as the storage and
maintenance of task rules in WM. Firstly, the current findings support a distinction
between the executive demands of task switching and task mixing by showing that the
contributions of these differential aspects of executive control to the task switching cost
can be dissociated. Additionally, the finding that the flanker task and attentional capture
task are differentially affected by load on these different executive demands supports
the view that the executive demands for task switching and task mixing are dissociable
and might be divided between transient (implicated in the flanker task) and sustained
(implicated in the attentional capture task) control processes, respectively. This point is
further clarified in section 7.1.3.
7.1.5 Task switching with stimuli and responses affording only one task
In Chapter 3 the effect of task switching on selective attention performance was
extended to situations in which neither the task stimuli (as in Chapter 2) nor task
responses overlapped between the two tasks. Previous research suggested that task
switching only incurred a RT cost when either responses or stimuli were shared between
tasks (Meiran, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995, Experiment 4; Ruthruff, Remington &
Johnston, 2001; Sumner & Ahmed, 2006). Contrary to much of the task switching
literature, and in support of Rubin and Meiran’s (2005) more recent finding of large and
significant task switch costs even when stimuli and responses do not overlap, task129
switching in the current study detrimentally affected task performance even when the
two tasks were entirely separate. This supports a more general demand made by task
switching on executive control of coordinating two different tasks.
7.1.6 The effect of task switching on external versus internal distraction
Chapter 5 demonstrated an additional and contrary effect of loading executive control
with a task switch additional to reaction time costs and distractor interference effects in
selective attention tasks: task switching led to reduced interference from internal
distraction (mind wandering episodes). This is an interesting finding as it suggests that
contrary to the costs associated with task switching, in reaction times and ignoring
external distractors, loading executive control makes one less likely to experience mind
wandering, which could be considered a benefit under some circumstances. In some
senses, however, this may be considered a cost, because mind wandering plays an
important role in novel and stimulus-independent human thought and behaviour.
7.1.7 The effect of task switching on distractor interference: greater executive demand
in switch versus pure trials or stronger task-set representations in pure versus switch
trials?
When performing the selective attention tasks after a switch from another task the task-
set representation stored in working memory will be less well established than when
repeating the same task due to the need to reconfigure the task-set anew on the switch
trial. This raises the interesting possibility that increased distractor interference in
switch versus pure trials could be explained by a less well established task-set in the
selective attention task on the switch compared to pure trials. When a task-set is less130
well established the distinction between the target and distractor will be less clear, thus
increasing competition from the distractor to control behaviour.
However, when a task-set is less well established, so would be the associations
of each stimulus and response. Take, for example, the flanker task, where a consistent
increase in distractor effects was found during task switching. The reduction in
stimulus-response associations with a less clear task-set should impact both the target
and the distractor stimulus. Hence, a less well established task-set might result in
prolonged overall RTs in both the congruent and incongruent trials due to the target
being less strongly associated with the correct response. More importantly, smaller
response competition effects from a distractor might be expected in this situation, given
that the distractor will be less strongly associated with a competing response in the
incongruent trials.
Additionally, it seems more parsimonious to assume, based on the combination
of previous findings that task switching loads executive control (e.g. Monsell, 2003),
and that loading working memory results in increased distractor interference (e.g. Lavie
2000; Lavie et al., 2004), that it is the executive demand of switching tasks which
results in reduced distractor interference.
Support for the executive demand of a task switch being responsible for the
revealed reduction in selective attention ability, without the confound of a less well
established task-set in switch versus pure trials, comes from my finding that task mixing
results in increased distractor interference in the attentional capture task. As discussed
in Chapter 4, the literature suggests that the requirement to mix tasks loads on executive
control (Braver et al., 2003; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000).
Investigating the effect of task mixing on attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton
involves comparing two conditions (pure trials in the between block design and131
nonswitch trials in the AAABBB within block design) in which the current task-set
should be similarly established in working memory, but in which executive demand is
greater in nonswitch compared to pure trials due to a more control demanding task
context (e.g. Rubin & Meiran, 2005). After performance of the initial trial of a new task
in the AAABBB design (i.e. the switch trial), the task-set should be fully ‘set’, so that
on subsequent performance of the task in the nonswitch trial the task-set will be as well
established as in the pure trials in the between block design. Indeed, the task switch cost
for a predictable switch is seen only on the first trial of a task (Rogers & Monsell,
1995). Thus, the effect of task mixing on distractor interference cannot be explained by
a less well established task-set in nonswitch compared to pure trials, suggesting that the
effect of both task mixing and task switching on distractor interference is rather due to
the executive demand associated with switching and mixing tasks.
7.1.8 Executive control in the attentional capture and flanker tasks: evidence for the
involvement of separable control processes
There are two lines of evidence proffering support for the view that the attentional
capture task and flanker task rely on control from different executive processes. Firstly,
as outlined above, detrimental flanker task performance in task switch conditions in
Chapter 3 depended on the presence of shared responses between hands: when the
responses to the two tasks were further separated so that one task was mapped to one
hand, and one to the other, flanker task performance was unaffected by task switching.
Conversely, the capture of attention by an irrelevant singleton was still greater in switch
compared to pure trials, even when the responses to the two tasks were separated
between hands. This dissociation suggests that performance on the two selective
attention tasks reflects the operation of different aspects of executive control. Distractor132
rejection in the flanker task was not affected by a switch when that switch did not
introduce further interference between responses, i.e. the responses were mapped to
separate hands. The executive control requirements of distractor rejection in the flanker
task may centre around the resolution of (and indeed may be triggered by) response-
competition. The effect of task switching on attentional capture, by contrast, may rely
on interference at a later stage of processing, and as such would be unaffected by the
elimination of additional interference at the response-competition level when task
switching. The executive control required to avoid attentional capture by an irrelevant
singleton may rely on another aspect of executive control.
Further elucidation of a possible distinction between the executive control
required by each selective attention task was provided by Chapter 4, where the previous
within-block cost of task switching was separated into two constituent components; the
specific cost of switching to a new task compared to repeating tasks, and the cost of
mixing two tasks within the same block compared to performing one task. The
experiments reviewed in Chapter 4 provide evidence that the distinction between the
seemingly different executive requirements of the flanker and attentional capture tasks,
as tentatively suggested by the findings of Chapter 3, could be mapped to the distinction
between the executive requirements of task switching and task mixing. Rejection of a
distractor in the flanker task required the availability of those executive resources which
were loaded by switching between tasks, whilst avoiding capture of attention by an
irrelevant singleton required the availability of those executive resources involved in
mixing tasks within a block. This double dissociation suggests that these two tasks may
map onto the different aspects of executive control hypothesized in the literature to
reflect transient (task switching) or sustained (task mixing) control processes (Braver et
al., 2003; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Logan &133
Bundeson, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). Perhaps the transient control processes
involved in task switching are required by response interference resolution in the flanker
task. Conversely, the more sustained control process required by mixing tasks may act
to maintain representations of the target feature in the presence of a salient but irrelevant
singleton feature, making it essential for successful performance of the attentional
capture task.
Combined, these two lines of evidence suggest a distinction between (possibly
transient) executive control required by performance of the flanker task and switching
between tasks, and (possibly more sustained) executive control required by performance
of the attentional capture tasks and the requirement to mix more than one task within a
block.
7.1.9 Individual differences in executive capacity predict task switching and selective
attention performance
Individuals with low operational working memory capacity showed greater RT costs of
task switching and reduced selective attention performance (Chapter 6). In support of
the hypothesis tested in this thesis, individuals who had high executive capacity were
able to use their extra capacity to protect them to some extent from the cost of switching
tasks and the interference from distractors in the flanker task, compared to those with
low executive capacity.
Performing a switch between tasks may reduce the executive capacity of high
spans to that of low spans, and thus artificially eliminate the advantage high span
individuals benefit from in performing a selective attention task. High spans
demonstrated similar interference from distractors when performing a switch between
tasks as low spans when they simply repeated performance of one task. Thus, once a134
high span performs a task switch, the executive capacity available to high spans for
performing the selective attention task is similar to that available to low spans under no
executive demand, and as such high and low spans did not perform differently on a
selective attention task under these conditions.
Interestingly, the effect of operational working memory span on task switching
performance was only revealed in the flanker task, but not in the visual search task. It is
possible that high-spans directed their extra capacity onto the flanker task, since this
was the more taxing on executive resources, due to the presence of the response-
competitive distractor. Indeed, the main function of executive capacity may be to
maintain target representations and block distractor interference (Kane and Engle,
2002), and thus it is likely that executive resources will be directed towards the task
containing greater interference.
An interesting question is what mechanism allows participants with greater
executive capacity to more easily reject distractors in a selective attention task. The
effect of working memory span on selective attention performance could, at least partly,
be due to high spans extra executive capacity enabling them to more quickly constrict
their visual attention (Heitz and Engle, 2007), and thus more quickly reject the
distractor in incongruent trials, because it more quickly ends up outside the focus of
attention. Loading executive resources with a requirement to switch between two tasks
may, therefore, reduce the speed at which depleted executive resources can constrict the
focus of attention in switch compared to pure trials, and thus effect selective attention
performance.135
7.1.10 Task difficulty
If increasing task difficulty, regardless of executive load, necessarily resulted in
increased distraction, then in situations where task switching increases, and executive
demand does not, there should be no effect on distractibility. In Chapter 5, rates of
TUTs, a form of internal distraction, were decreased by task switch compared to task
repeat conditions, but were not decreased by task difficulty when compared between the
two tasks: the task associated with longer RTs, and thus greater task difficulty, was
associated with increased, rather than decreased rates of TUT compared to the easier
task. This suggests that differences in task difficulty are not responsible for the decrease
in TUTs after task switching.
In addition, TUTs were reduced in situations when task switching demanded
executive control, whereas distractor interference was increased under these
circumstances. If task difficulty results in increased distraction then both internal and
external distraction should increase as task difficulty increased. This was clearly not the
case. Instead, internal versus external distraction were conversely affected by task
switching as would be predicted by a theory suggesting that the availability of executive
control is reduced under task switch conditions.
These findings suggest that the effect of task switching on distractor interference
is related to executive control, and not simply task difficulty.
In summary, my overall findings combine to offer strong support for a critical role of
executive control in preventing distractor interference and allowing mind wandering,
and establish preliminary evidence that different aspects of executive control are
involved in different selective attention tasks.136
7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH FOR EVERYDAY LIFE
7.2.1 Detrimental effects of everyday ‘multi-tasking’
The current research strongly suggests that performance of everyday tasks will be
detrimentally affected when attempts are made to switch attentional resources from one
task to another. A good example is driving and talking on the phone. Switching between
driving and a conversation will result in not only slowed reaction times to visual stimuli,
such as signs and traffic lights, but also to a greater likelihood that irrelevant items in
the visual scene (such as a bright red jacket worn by a pedestrian) will capture attention,
stealing attentional resources away from the main task of driving. Perhaps less
importantly in the current example, the conversation would also suffer from slow
responses and distraction, especially during moments of driving which are particularly
demanding, such as negotiating a complicated roundabout. Note that conversations in
which the other person is unaware of the needs of the driving (such as a person on the
other end of a phone) may result in greater deficits because the other person will not
stop talking or demanding your attention when driving requirements increase. Thus,
according to the current findings, the demands of a phone conversation whilst driving
would not be alleviated by the use of a hands free kit.
Chapter 6 also suggests that the extra time taken on and greater distractibility in
everyday tasks when trying to switch between tasks would be more pronounced for
people whose executive capacity is lower, i.e. those with low operational working
memory spans, as well as in situations already demanding high levels of executive
control, such as finding a parking space in a busy car park full of pedestrians and other
cars.137
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
7.3.1 Executive control, rejecting distractors, and switching between tasks
Although the current work highlights the importance of general executive control
availability for distractor rejection, and even distinguishes different executive control
requirements for the flanker task and attentional capture task, the precise nature of the
executive involvement in distractor rejection remains unclear. Further research is
required to more specifically highlight the aspects of executive control important in
attending to targets whilst ignoring distractors.
Behavioural methods may be fruitful in order to elucidate more precisely which
aspects of executive control are involved in avoiding distraction in the flanker task and
attentional capture task. Investigating a wider array of selective attention tasks would
allow comparison of the effects of loading different aspects of executive control (for
example that required by task mixing and that required by task switching) on different
selective attention tasks. Similarities between tasks which load one type of executive
control or the other would serve to highlight the specific role of each of these types of
executive control. For example, if slower, sustained executive control involved in target
maintenance is loaded in task mixing, then task mixing should interfere with target
performance only in those selective attention tasks in which distractor rejection
critically relies on maintenance of target and/or distractor representations, for example
this type of control should not affect the Posner cueing task, in which the distractor is
unrelated to the target representation (attention is captured by a location cued by a
central cue). On the other hand, if a simple task switch relies on transient control
processes involved in resolving interference between responses, then only performance
on selective attention tasks in which distractors create response competition, such as the138
Stroop task, or some other transient interference, will be affected by a simple task
switch.
Another avenue would be to investigate whether the individual differences in
executive capacity which affected distractor rejection performance in the flanker task,
also affect attentional capture by irrelevant singletons. Given that operational working
memory span is thought to reflect the ability to maintain targets in the face of
interference from distracting information, which should reflect similar sustained control
processes to those which I have hypothesised to be involved in attentional capture task
performance, I would expect that operational working memory span would indeed affect
performance in the face of interference from irrelevant singleton distractors.
In regards to task switching, the current research highlights the contributions of
the specific executive demand of task switching and task mixing, and the effects of
these executive demands on selective attention performance. An interesting direction for
future research would be to further dissect the executive demand of task switching, such
as the additional RT costs associated with performing the first trial in a run, and the
effects of these demands on selective attention performance.
7.3.2 Complementary neuroscientific research
If activation in the frontal lobe is increased during task switching (e.g. Brass and Von
Cramon, 2002; Braver, Reynolds and Donaldson, 2003; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger,
and Carter, 2000), then in situations in which task switching leads to an incorrect or
slowed response, there should be relatively greater activation in areas associated with
processing the distractor. This would provide further evidence that task switching loads
frontal executive resources, and that this reduces the availability of these resources to139
reject distractors and so is associated with increased activation associated with
distractors in selective attention tasks.
Whilst the issue of executive capacity is an area of fruitful research, it has
remained elusive as to what exactly operational working memory span measures. Is it
the total amount of an executive resource available to each individual, is it the ability of
each individual to effectively use the executive capacity they have, does it reflect
differences between individuals in the way in which they allocate executive control
resources? Although these questions are perhaps out of reach given the knowledge and
current techniques available, it is important to begin directing research towards
answering these questions. Neuroimaging techniques might be useful in elucidating the
mechanisms involved in determining working memory capacity. For example, if
working memory capacity reflects the amount of executive control actively exerted in
response to task demands, then individuals with high operational working memory span
might show a greater increase in frontal cortex activity in situations demanding extra
executive control, such as switching tasks versus repeating tasks, than individuals with
low operational working memory spans. Conversely, if high working memory capacity
reflects more efficient use of limited executive resources, then high operational working
memory span might be associated with a smaller increase in frontal activity under
switch compared to repeat conditions. In this way high working memory capacity would
protect against distractor interference because more efficient use of a limited resource
results in greater ‘leftover’ working memory (executive) capacity for distractor
rejection. Combining this research with behavioural research measuring distractibility
would provide behavioural correlates to compare brain activity with.
Finally, if different aspects of executive control are involved in different
selective attention tasks, then it might be expected that activation associated with140
executive control of the two tasks have different frontal locations. For example, the
ACC has often been implicated in the resolution of transient interference triggered by
response competition. This area might be more activated in the flanker task, than in the
attentional capture task. Areas previously associated with sustained maintenance of
target/distractor representations in working memory should similarly show relatively
greater activation during performance of the attentional capture task.
In summary, the current research provides support for the control of selective attention
by executive resources and offers a strong basis for interesting and fruitful further
research.141
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